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[Approximately half of the states in the United States of America have statutes 
recognising the reality of transsexualism.  US Attorney and transgender legal 
historian, Katrina Rose, examines one of the earliest of these, revealing that Louisi-
ana legislators in 1968 clearly understood the difference between gay marriages, 
and heterosexual marriages in which one spouse is transsexual.  Rose also suggests 
that adoption of such a statute should be viewed expansively, with positive ramifica-
tions throughout the state’s body of law. Additionally, she offers a scathing critique 
of the hypocrisy which has long permeated the American gay rights movement’s 
willingness to minimise transgender issues and to avoid treating transsexuals as 
equals. It is argued that this is no longer mere political polemic as the growing 
number of sweeping anti-gay constitutional amendments has transformed the his-
tory of transgendered people having no voice in the gay-marriage-dominated gay 
agenda into an essential element of transsexuals’ defence where legislative intent of 
such amendments are an issue in matters involving transsexuals.] 
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I INTRODUCTION 
 
A The Setting 
 
          I make jokes about the black people, and why not? Because I’m not one.1  
 
On 24 July 2003, the California Senate gave its approval to Assembly Bill 196,2 an 
amendment to that state’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (‘FEHA]) to forbid 
discrimination based on gender identity.3  On 2 August 2003, prior to his being 
recalled in favour of Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor Gray Davis signed the bill.4   
 
This enactment is significant not simply in terms of the protection provided by 
revised statute for transgendered Californians but also because it marks only the 
second time that the so-called “incremental progress” strategy – of gays getting 
their rights first while transgendered people are forced to remain without protection 
from the ravages of discrimination – mandated by gay politicos for the transgen-
dered has actually worked at the state level.5 
                                                        
1
 NBC Television (USA), Saturday Night Live, 28 January 1984, monologue of Don Rickles. 
2
 Per the Legislative Council: 
This bill would expand the prohibition on sexual discrimination and harassment by including 
gender, as defined, in the definition of sex. The bill would permit employers to require em-
ployees to comply with reasonable workplace appearance, grooming, and dress standards 
consistent with state and federal law, provided that employees are allowed to appear or dress 
consistently with their gender identity. (emphasis added). 
Legislative Counsel’s Digest, 2003 CAL. A.B. 196 (emphasis added). 
3
 Jim Herron Zamora, ‘Senate OKs Gender Identity Bill; It Bans Discrimination Against Transsexuals’ 
San Francisco Chronicle, 25 July 2003; Lisa Leff, ‘Senate Passes Bill Outlawing Bias Against Trans-
gendered Resident’, Sacramento Bee, 25 July 2003. 
4
 TLPI, ‘California Governor Signs Historic Anti-Discrimination Bill’, (Press Release, 3 August 2003),  
Available on-line at: <http://www.transgenderlaw.org/carelease.htm>. 
Subsequently, the California Legislature passed a bill which tidied up diverse provisions of the FEHA 
and the Labour Code – all of which now include the trans-inclusive language.  ‘California Passes Gay  
Labour Law’, 365gay.com, 16 August 2004, Available on-line at:  
<http://www.365gay.com/newscon04/08/ 081604calLabor.htm>.  In fairness to the Governator, he did 
sign this bill.  2004 CAL. AB 2900, enacted as, 2004 CAL. LAWS Ch. 788 (approved 24 September 
2004). 
5
 This concept has worked slightly more often at the county and municipal level.  However, the disparity 
between jurisdictions where gays, but not transgendered people, are afforded a right of redress against 
discrimination and those that have full inclusion is, over three decades after Stonewall, still depressingly 
staggering.  According to information on the website of the Human Rights Campaign (HRC), the ratio of 
jurisdictions with sexual orientation protection to those with both sexual orientation and gender identity 
is 153 to 65.  Moreover, even now some localities propose and pass anti-discrimination ordinances which 
leave out the segment of the GLBT community that is most in need of anti-discrimination protection.  
Compare DALLAS, TEXAS CODE § 46-4 (18) (2002) (‘Sexual orientation means an individual’s real 
or perceived orientation as heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual or an individual’s real or perceived 
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This strategy, if it can truly be called one, has long been assailed by transgendered 
people.6 At best, it is seen as a failed concept, as prior to AB 196, more state legis-
latures had passed fully-inclusive GLBT rights bills than had ever gone back and 
rectified non-inclusive statutes.7  At worst, the concept is seen as a flat-out lie that 
was designed to con the transgendered into not bringing to the attention of legisla-
tors (those considering gay-only rights proposals) the fact that such laws leave gays 
and the transgendered legally unequal to each other even though those most apt to 
discriminate see no difference between the butchest gay male and the most pass-
able, feminine male-to-female transsexual.8 
 
A corollary to “incremental progress” is the edict to transgendered people com-
manding them to eschew the Legisiature in general in favour of utilising existing 
law to garner favourable court decisions, typically based in some manner on the 
concept of “gender stereotyping,” as recognised by the US Supreme Court in 1989 
in Price Waterhouse v Hopkins.9   
 
However, this rests on two shaky assumptions: transgendered plaintiffs being able 
to find competent (or even any10) legal representation and the cases brought by 
these plaintiffs landing in courts that will actually hear them.  Although the Price 
Waterhouse line of transgender cases is indeed more encouraging than the Hollo-
way v Arthur Andersen11 line that it may (or may not) have supplanted, even a 
number of courts which do look favourably upon the “gender stereotyping” theory 
have bluntly asserted that a transsexual still would be without recourse if discrimi-
nated against specifically because of having a transsexual history,12 something that 
                                                                                                                                 
gender identity.’) (trans-inclusive); with FORT WORTH, TEXAS CODE § 17-46 (2004) (‘Sexual 
orientation means: heterosexuality, homosexuality or bisexuality or being identified with such orienta-
tion.’) (non-trans-inclusive). 
6
 Katrina C. Rose, ‘Conservaqueers Not Been Vedy, Vedy Good To Us’, Texas Triangle, 13 October 
2000, Available on-line at:  <http://www.txtriangle.com/archive/901/vpkatrose.htm> (last visited 12 
September 2004). 
7
 With the first American state gay rights statute, Wisconsin’s, having never been amended even after 
20+ years.  1981 WIS. LAWS Ch. 112.   
Minnesota, in 1993, and New Mexico a decade later both were transgender-inclusive in the first instance.  
See 1993 MINN. LAWS Ch. 22; and 2003 N.M. LAWS Ch. 383.  Rhode Island’s 1995 gay-only rights 
law was revised to include the transgendered in 2001.  2001 R.I. LAWS Ch. 340. 
8
 ‘Straight-acting’ gays should think twice before turning their backs on less mainstream queers. Our 
enemies don’t distinguish between the two.’ Maria Helena Dolan, ‘Real Fascists Hate Queers’, Southern 
Voice, 25 July 2003; see also John Gallagher, ‘For Transsexuals 1994 is 1969’, The Advocate, 23 August 
1994, 59, 60 (AEGIS Executive Director Dallas Denny, noting a religionist right, trans-inclusive anti-
gay initiative in Washington and observing, ‘Those people don’t distinguish between us.’). 
9
 490 US 228 (1989). 
10
 Rudy Serra and Annette E. Skinner, ‘Counseling the Gay, Lesbian, or Transgender Client’ (2001) 80 
Michigan Bar Journal 52. 
11
 See Part V 
12
 See Smith v City of Salem, 378 F 3d 566 (6th Cir, 2004); and Doe v United Consumer Financial Svcs., 
No. 1:01 CV 1112 (ND Ohio, 2001) (holding that Title VII can aid a transsexual against employment 
discrimination but because of gender stereotyping, not because of transsexualism per se).  Another recent 
noteworthy decision is the unpublished Tronetti v TLC Healthnet Lakeshore Hospital.  No. 03-CV-
0375E(Sc), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23757 (WD NY, 26 September 2003).  Though favourable in that it 
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likely would be the case with a deeply-closeted, already-transitioned and fully-
passable transsexual who is outed.13  And, of course, this definitely would be the 
case should an employer brazenly post a sign that reads: transsexuals need not 
apply.  Additionally, some federal courts have totally rejected the notion that trans-
gendered people have any place whatsoever in the Price Waterhouse-inspired 
“gender stereotyping” jurisprudence.14  Consequently, in the absence of any en-
forceable state or local proscription against such discrimination, transgendered 
people are still for all practical purposes defenceless.15   
 
In this article I will examine an area that, curiously in my view, seems to have 
escaped the notice of those American GLB (and even T) organisations that have 
touted, often to the exclusion of seeking coverage for transgendered people in 
proposed new sexual orientation legislation, the utilisation of existing law as the 
methodology for the transgendered.16  What I will propose is what should logically 
result from transsexual-specific birth certificate statutes being read in conjunction 
with state statutes proscribing discrimination based on sex.  The potential in such a 
reading is significant not only in and of itself17 but also because it forces out into 
the open a dirty little secret of “incremental progress” dogma: that almost twice as 
many American state-level jurisdictions currently recognise the existence of trans-
sexualism as ever have established sexual orientation-based employment anti-
discrimination protection: 25 to 14; and, the ratio of the former to states that fully 
                                                                                                                                 
rejects older anti-transsexual federal case law, it nevertheless leans on sex stereotyping rather than 
transsexualism in its own right. 
13
 Sarah Huntley, ‘A Life’s Secret Unfolds – City Pays $55,000 For Disclosure, But Damage is Done’, 
Rocky Mountain News (Denver), 13 July 2002. 
14
 Sweet v Mulberry Lutheran Home, NO. IP02-0320-C-H/K, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11373 (SD Ind 6 
June  2003); Oiler v Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., No. 00-3114 SECTION: “I”, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
17417 (ED La, 16 September 2002).  Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit also has indicated strong 
doubts regarding the expansiveness of Price Waterhouse v Hopkins.  Hamm v Weyauwega Milk Prod-
ucts, Inc., 332 F 3d 1058, 1068 (7th Cir, 2003) (‘Sex stereotyping’ should not be regarded as a form of 
sex discrimination, though it will sometimes, as in the Hopkins case, be evidence of sex discrimination.’) 
(Posner J concurring). 
15
 If it is not obvious by now, in this article I will be dealing almost exclusively with American law.  
Progress has been far more evident in both the UK and Australia.  P v S and Cornwall County Council, 
[1997] 2 FCR 180; Sheffield v Air Foyle Charter Airlines, No. 1200389/97 (Industrial Tribunal, 29 May 
1998);  Menzies v Waycott [2001] VCAT 415. 
16
 See generally Joe Crea, ‘ENDA Debate Overlooks Title VII Trans Benefits: Experts; HRC, Activists 
Say That Trans ENDA Helps Gays’, Washington Blade, 24 September 2004,  
<http://www.washblade.com/ 2004/9-24/news/national/enda.cfm>; see also Stephen Clark, ‘HRC Has  
Trans Issue Backward’, Washington Blade, 20 August 2004, <http://www.washblade.com/ 2004/8- 
20/view/letters/letters.cfm>. 
17
 If fully recognised in all possible jurisdictions, it would vastly increase employment outlook of 
transgendered people. 
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recognise gay relationships via statute18 is 2519 to 0, not a ratio at all (though it 
would be 25 to 1 if one takes Vermont Civil Unions20 into consideration.) 
 
At the outset as well I must acknowledge that this article is limited almost exclu-
sively to American law and American GLBT socio-political life.  Though problems 
persist in both Australia and the UK (and elsewhere), the recent passage of the 
latter’s Gender Recognition Act,21 and the direct influence of religionist zealots on 
government being far less in both, it is legitimate to say that the position of trans-
sexuals is far better in Australia and the UK than in the US.  And, I realise that any 
analysis regarding any potential applicability of Australia’s new anti-same-sex 
marriage statute22 to transsexuals likely will not work the same as American state 
(or federal) statutory interaction. Nevertheless, I must note that, though I did not 
follow the Australian debate closely, the research I have done indicates that the 
plain language of the measure does not directly address recent Australian pro-
recognition decisions23 and does not address the effect of birth certificate statutes – 
either from Australian states24 or American states or, for that matter, the new UK. 
G.R.A.  Consequently, and despite it being beyond the scope of this article, it is my 
position that the new Australian anti-marriage statute does not impugn any rights of 
transsexuals. 
 
Part II of this article looks at how a pre-1964 American federal statute addressing 
legal recognition of transsexuals’ gender transition could have laid sufficient 
groundwork for courts to accept that Title VII’s concept of ‘because of sex’ encom-
passes ‘because of change of sex.’  Part III looks at the 1968 Louisiana transsexual 
birth certificate statute – and certain aspects of its apparently-long-forgotten legisla-
tive history.  Part IV is a look at one particular divisive aspect of Louisiana’s legal 
landscape of today: its recently-approved anti-gay-marriage constitutional amend-
ment.  In Part V, I detail my assertion that the narrow view of Title VII espoused by 
some federal courts should have a functional flip side in state-level sex discrimina-
                                                        
18
 Here I purposely do not include Massachusetts because it arose from a court decision that, at the very 
least, may be overturned by a state constitutional amendment and may ultimately fall to a federal 
amendment.  See In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 NE 2d 565 (Mass, 2004); and, Good-
ridge v Department of Health, 798 NE 2d 941 (Mass, 2003). 
19
 Alyson Dodi Meiselman, Katrina C Rose and Phyllis Randolph Frye, ‘Cause of Action For Legal 
Change of Gender’, 24 CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 135 (2004).  
20
 2000 VT. LAWS Ch. 91. 
21
 Gender Recognition Act 2004 (UK). 
22
 Marriage Legislation Amendment Act 2004 (Cth). 
23
 Compare Attorney-General v Kevin and Jennifer [2003] 30 FLR 1 (en banc); and Secretary, Depart-
ment of Social Security v S.R.A. (1993) 118 ALR 467; with In re the Marriage of C & D (falsely called 
C) (1979) 28 ALR 524.  Beyond this is the actual text, which reads in pertinent part that ‘marriage 
means the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered into for life’ 
and 
A union solemnised in a foreign country between: 
(a) a man and another man; or 
(b) a woman and another woman; 
must not be recognised as a marriage in Australia. 
Marriage Legislation Amendment Act, 2004, schedule 1 (1) and 1 (3) (Cth). 
24
 For example, see Sexual Reassignment Act 1988 (SA). 
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tion law – a flip side of which transsexuals, and perhaps all transgendered people, 
should be able to avail themselves but, as yet, apparently have not.  Part VI is a 
brief look at what may be the reason that the legal theory analysed in Part V has 
never been championed by the most influential of gay politicos that such a legal 
theory would require acknowledgement and acceptance of the reality of change of 
sex. 
 
B The Temperament 
The italicised quote at the beginning of this article, from a 1984 episode of Saturday 
Night Live hosted by the notorious insult comedian Don Rickles, may seem odd – 
even offensive – as an opening for an article in favour of equality (and, even for an 
SNL monologue of two decades past.)  Yet, it can be strongly likened to the histori-
cally cavalier attitude behind declarations by American gays and lesbians regarding 
what are acceptable and unacceptable strategies are for securing basic civil rights 
for transgendered people: when these strategies fail, it is not the gay and lesbian 
advocates of them who are adversely affected.   
 
I make policy that might negatively affect transsexual people, and why not? Be-
cause I’m not one. 
 
Is there any real difference?25   
 
The continuing insistence on adherence to policies – both ostensibly gay-only (such 
as pushing for same-sex marriage despite the obviousness of the strength of the 
opposition to it)26 and those directly, or even indirectly, affecting transgendered 
people – that are not simply failures but that actually inspire backlashes which 
negatively affect the transgendered to a far greater degree than against gays, lesbi-
ans and bisexuals are the embodiment of this mindset.  The failure of these gay 
policies simply leaves gays in the position they were before, but not any worse off.27  
Transsexuals, however, actually have had existing rights (or at least those which 
have been logically assumed to exist) taken away.28  My hope is for this article, in 
                                                        
25
 And, for those uncomfortable with utilising Don Rickles as a politico-legal analogy, I offer historian 
Eugene D. Genovese’s assessment of racial relations: ‘Wherever racial subordination exists, racism 
exists….’  Eugene D Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll – The World the Slaves Made (1974) 4.  Wherever 
subordination of transgendered people’s interests exists, transphobia exists. 
26
 Katrina C Rose, ‘An Open Letter to Scott Hedin (Part Three)’, Texas Triangle, 30 March 2001,  
<http://www.txtriangle.com/archive/925/vpkatrose.htm> (last visited 14 September 2004). 
27
 Though beyond the scope of this article, I feel I must make it clear that I do realise that even this is 
beginning to change.  It is debatable whether any of the Canadian gay marriages constitute anything 
which an American gay couple can truly claim to have ‘lost.’  A recent bankruptcy decision may, or may 
not, provide a test for whether this could be true.  In re Kandu, No. 03-51312 (WD Wash, 17 August  
2004).  However, a number of anti-gay-marriage backlash statutes and constitutional amendments are 
being drawn broadly enough so as to inspire worry that they may wipe out non-marital domestic partner-
ship rights.  NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, CODE OF ORDINANCES § 87-1.. 
28
 See generally the marriage decisions: Kantaras v Kantaras, No. 2D03-1377, 2004 Fla. App, LEXIS 
10997 (Fla Ct App, 23 July 2004); In re Nash and Barr, Nos. 2002-T-0149 & 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 
23097095 (Ohio Ct App, 31 December 2003); In re Gardiner, 42 P3d 120 (Kan, 2002), cert. denied sub 
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addition to helping transsexuals in many jurisdictions to gain access to the courts to 
combat employment discrimination, is that it will inspire thoughtful analysis of 
what advocates of “incremental progress” actually are hoping to see become of 
transgender political, social and legal viability. 
 
And, once the real problems are identified, and once the real historical backdrop 
against which they lay is clarified, then the real solutions can be formulated and 
actually implemented – hopefully by GLBT rights organisations whose staffs truly 
reflect the transgender-inclusive nature of the community of persecuted sexual 
minorities.29 
 
II THE TALE OF TITAN V LOSE-UNION AND THE 
RAMIFICATIONS OF THE 1949 FEDERAL GENDER 
TRANSITION RECOGNITION ACT  
 
A full understanding of transgender law requires an examination not simply of 
applicable law, but also the history that influenced how the law came into being – 
and the Federal Gender Transition Recognition Act (‘FGTRA’) needs to be fully 
understood to be appreciated. 
 
Following the 1948 national elections – featuring President Harry Truman’s 
unlikely victory over Republican Thomas Dewey, States’ Rightist Strom Thurmond 
and progressive Henry Wallace30 – several United States House and Senate mem-
bers decompressed31 by taking a ski vacation to Switzerland.  While there, one 
among them – one who happened to be a lawyer – heard of an interesting decision 
that had been handed down by a Swiss Cantonal Court a few years earlier, In re 
Leber.32  The decision recognised the concept of legal change of sex status for a 
                                                                                                                                 
nom, Gardiner v Gardiner, 537 US 825 (2002); and Littleton v Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 225 (Tex. App. – 
San Antonio 1999, pet. denied), cert. denied, 531 US 872 (2000). 
29
 Donna Cartwright, ‘Turning HRC’s Promise Into Action’, Gay City News, 2 September 2004, 
<http://www.gaycitynews.com/gcn_336/turninghrcspromise.html> (last visited 14 September 2004) 
(imploring HRC to ‘hire transgender-identified people as soon as possible for prominent, visible staff 
positions, preferably those that involve regular contact with legislators’ something the organisation has a 
long history of not doing). 
30
 ‘Electoral Votes for President and Vice President 1941-1953’, <http://www.archives.gov/ fed-
eral_register/electoral_college/votes/1941_1953.html#1948> (last visited 24 September 2004). 
31
 Probably not a phrase in wide use at the time, but descriptive nevertheless. 
32
 And this decision relied on precedent that was even then almost fifteen years old, a decision not 
afforded the formality of a case citation, but which could appear to be properly referred to as In re 
Businger, the case of Margrith (nee Niklaus) Businger whose petition was granted by the Council of 
State of the Canton of Nidwald on 19 October 1931.  Eugene de Savitsch, Homosexuality, Transvestism 
and Change of Sex (1958) 101-102 (English translation of the In re Leber opinion.)  The Leber court 
noted that Businger 
suffered from a feminine psyche, which influenced his entire behaviour.  He had a predilec-
tion for female activities and, obeying irresistible impulses, dressed himself as a woman 
whenever possible: he was ill at ease in masculine garments and considered the obligation to 
wear them both disagreeable and coercive.  From the physical point of view there was noth-
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person who undergoes medical treatment for what was then referred to as inversion 
but has in the years since come to be referred to as transsexualism.33 
 
One of that group of Americans was a physician, and sought out the medical experts 
who were involved in the Leber case and an informal, yet informative, meeting 
resulted.  Once back in America, the members of Congress who had been enlight-
ened about In re Leber proposed that Congress enact legislation to deal positively 
with this sort of situation.  It was viewed as necessary recognition of a medical 
condition by an entity that keeps records and the necessity of that entity, and all 
lower government entities, to be consistent in how they statistically categorise 
individuals according to sex. It was not seen as a civil rights measure as, in that era, 
civil rights proposals were D.O.A. in Congress.34  It was viewed purely as a medical 
matter, not as a moral issue or a civil rights agenda item, and it passed easily, with-
out any rancour and with a bare minimum of debate evident from the Congressional 
Record, and was unceremoniously signed into law by President Harry Truman 
along with a number of other bills. 
 
Fifteen years later, during the Lyndon Johnson administration, upfront civil rights 
bills fared a bit better and, in 1964, a comprehensive Civil Rights Act was enacted35 
which outlawed (among other things) discrimination in employment based on race, 
religion and, thanks to a last-minute amendment that received precious little debate, 
sex.36  That same year, Patricia Titan, a male-to-female transsexual from the small 
town of Rosedale, Louisiana, underwent sex reassignment surgery in Los Angeles, 
completing her transition from male to female. 
 
Eventually, Patricia moved back to Louisiana, but not to her birthplace.  Instead, 
she settled in the state capitol of Baton Rouge.  In 1975, the same year that the first 
attempt was made to enact a federal gay rights law,37 she secured a secretarial 
position at the Baton Rouge headquarters of the regional grocery store chain Lose-
Union.  After ten years with the company, during which time she had received 
several promotions, raises and commendations, her supervisor learned of her trans-
sexual history. 
 
                                                                                                                                 
ing feminine about Businger.  He had normal masculine genital organs, but he held them in 
such abhorrence that he attempted self-mutilation.  It was to prevent this that the surgeon 
deemed it necessary to castrate him.  Here we are dealing with a human being who, while 
possessing male genitalia, had in his psychological constitution cells which functioned in two 
ways, some in a masculine way and others in a feminine way.  Psychically he was more 
woman than man, but physically he was a combination of man and woman.  His desire to 
change his civic status and name was so strong that he threatened to commit suicide unless 
his wish was granted. 
Ibid 101 (summarising the facts of Businger’s case). 
33
 The term was coined by David O. Cauldwell but was later popularised by Harry Benjamin. Joanne 
Meyerowitz, How Sex Changed – A History of Transsexuality in the United States (2002) 15. 
34
 See generally Robert Mann, The Walls of Jericho (1996). 
35
 Act of 2 July 1964, PL 88-352, 78 Stat 253. 
36
 See Robert Stevens Miller Jr., ‘Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964’, 
(1967) 51 Minnesota Law Review 877, 879-84.  
37
 H.R. 166, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. (1975). 
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She was fired the next day, with the company specifically stating that she was being 
fired because she is a transsexual and that the presence of a transsexual on the 
company’s payroll would conflict with the company’s mission to operate according 
to Christian principles.  The termination letter even quoted verses from Leviticus 
and Deuteronomy.38 
 
Patricia brought a claim under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, alleging 
discrimination in employment because of sex and because of religion.  The attor-
neys for Lose-Union argued that Congress had had numerous opportunities to 
amend Title VII to include sexual orientation or sexual preference but had not done 
so (and even listed all of the proposals to do just that, proposals which had begin to 
be introduced in 1975), which meant that it would be judicial legislation to hold that 
an action for anti-transsexual discrimination was cognisable under Title VII.  
Patricia’s attorneys, however, argued that the company’s action against her was 
taken for no other reason than because she used to be male, though it was couched 
in terms of religionist oppression.  Analogising that, per the statute’s prohibition 
against discrimination based on religion, it was inconceivable that the company 
would be allowed to fire her if it had discovered that she used to be a Christian but 
was now an adherent to Judaism, there was no rational reason that the same princi-
ple should not apply to ‘sex.’ 
 
To this the company’s legal team replied, making note of that lack of debate over 
the addition of ‘sex’ to the Civil Rights Act,39 that Congress simply did not have the 
concept of ‘because of change of sex’ in mind when it enacted legislation outlawing 
discrimination ‘because of sex.’  Patricia’s attorneys, though, noted that Congress 
had enacted the FGTRA a decade and a half prior to Title VII, meaning that, al-
though it may not have been (in fact, unquestionably was not) front-and-centre 
during debate in 1964, Congress indeed did have a history of encompassing the 
concept of ‘change of sex’ when legislating on the subject of ‘sex.’ 
 
Noting the sex slate upon which Title VII was written by virtue of the existence of 
the FGTRA, the federal district court not only denied Lose-Union’s motion for 
summary judgment but granted Patricia’s.  The company appealed to the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, which in 1988 upheld the judgment in favour of Patricia 
by issuing a short, terse opinion, favourably citing the following passage from In re 
Ladrach, an Ohio Probate Court opinion issued the year prior denying a marriage 
license to a post-operative male-to-female transsexual but with the caveat: 
 
It seems obvious to the court that if a state permits such a change of sex on 
the birth certificate of a post-operative transsexual, either by statute or ad-
ministrative ruling, then a marriage license, if requested, must issue to 
such a person provided all other statutory requirements are fulfilled.40 
 
                                                        
38
 Leviticus 18: 22; Deuteronomy 22:5. 
39
 See Miller, above n 36. 
40
 In re Ladrach, 513 NE 2d 828, 831 (Ohio Prob Ct, Stark County, 1987) (emphasis added). 
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The federal appellate court surmised that the same rationale applied to Titan v Lose-
Union – indeed, to any case involving a transsexual seeking redress under Title VII 
for discrimination because of change of sex: while Title VII may not have said 
‘because of change of sex,’ it would be disingenuous not to apply Congress’ history 
of acknowledging the concept of ‘change of sex’ to usage of the word “sex” by 
itself. 
 
Lose-Union petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to hear the case, but the request was 
denied, leaving the FGTRA and Patricia Titan’s Title VII triumph to stand as re-
markably positive and enlightened developments in the area of transgender law. 
 
This was indeed a watershed moment in the history of transsexuals in America.  No 
longer could employers robotically force transsexuals out of the legitimate labour 
force and into the sex industry.  Anyone fired because of being transsexual (or 
suspected of being so) would have a right of redress to their government. 
 
Of course, there is just one problem concerning Titan v Lose-Union and the 
FGTRA, a problem of which legal practitioners absolutely must be aware. 
 
They never happened.41  
 
 
III 1968 LOUISIANA ACT NO. 611 
 
However much of Part II may seem like a cruel joke,42 please rest assured that, 
despite the fictional aspects of it, it was not intended as such.  More importantly, 
however fantastic portions of this Part may seem, rest assured to an equal degree 
that none of it is fictional. 
 
A 1968 (In and of Itself) 
In conducting the research that would eventually become part of this article, I 
reviewed microfilm of the Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Morning Advocate from the 
summer of 1968. In doing so, I was reminded of just how turbulent those times 
were.  I hadn’t initially zeroed in on the dates on which the legislative activity took 
                                                        
41
 Almost forgotten is that Arlette Leber and her court case (as well as In re Businger, the 1931 case cited 
therein as then-existing precedent) did happen – along with the other real cases, laws and proposals cited 
in the recount of Titan v Lose-Union.  Notably, twelve years after Ms. Leber's legal gender transition, Dr. 
Otto Riggenbach, concluded an evaluation of her with the following statement: “The operation, on the 
one part, combined with the permission of the authorities to change her civic status, on the other, has 
turned an unstable and unhappy individual into a useful and contented member of society.”  De Savitsch, 
above n 32. 
42
 Purists should note that in the introduction I speak of how the pre-1964 statute could have laid the 
groundwork for employment anti-discrimination protection, not that it did. 
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place (because I didn’t know which dates those were), so, assuming (wrongly as I 
will detail below) that the bill might have slipped under the radar I looked at issues 
from early June – in which there was ample coverage of the ongoing Viet Nam 
War,43 the assassinations of Sen. Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King, 44 and 
even events related to as-yet-unresolved conspiracy theories regarding an assassina-
tion several years prior.45 
 
Also, at this point, the entire Louisiana Legislature had only one African-American 
member, future New Orleans Mayor Ernest Morial, who then was in his first term 
as the first African-American member of the Louisiana Legislature since the post-
Civil War Reconstruction era of the nineteenth century.46  Moreover, in looking at 
all issues of the Morning Advocate from May through July of 1968, one can find 
any number of blatantly race-specific want-ads.47 
 
Nevertheless, it was during this era – with a law-and-order governor who viewed 
desecration of the U.S. flag as ‘disloyalty, which is a polite way of saying treason’48 
– that the Louisiana Legislature addressed the issue of transsexualism.   
A recipe for disaster for transsexuals? 
 
Surprisingly, not. 
 
 
B Act No. 611 
One of my assumptions about Louisiana’s 1968 birth certificate statute long had 
been that it had come into being solely at the behest of Reed Erickson, a wealthy 
female-to-male transsexual from Baton Rouge who founded (and funded) the Erick-
son Educational Foundation (EEF), one of the earliest American transgender re-
source outlets.49  Upon coming across what must be regarded, despite its brevity, as 
an extremely persuasive piece of the statute's legislative history, I realised that I 
apparently had been mistaken.50 
                                                        
43
 See generally, ‘American Planes Blast N. Viets Near Da Nang’, Morning Advocate (Baton Rouge, 
La.), 18 May 1968, 1. 
44
 ‘King Murder Suspect is Arrested in London’, Morning Advocate (Baton Rouge, La.), 9 June 1968, 1-
A;  ‘RFK Will be Buried in Arlington Today’, Morning Advocate (Baton Rouge, La.), 6 June 1968, 1-A. 
45
 Compare ‘Officer Claims Shaw Gave as Alias “Clay Bertrand,”’ Morning Advocate (Baton Rouge, 
La.), 27 July 1968, 20-A; with JFK (Warner Bros. 1991). 
46
 ‘State’s First Negro Legislator Says He’s “Angry Young Man”’, Morning Advocate (Baton Rouge, 
La.), 12 May 1968, 14-A. 
47
 Just one of many, a sales collection position had the bold heading “Colored Women.”  Morning 
Advocate (Baton Rouge, La.), 12 June 1968, Sec. C.  And, 1968 was less than a decade after the Legisla-
ture, spurred by court decisions, repealed mandatory school racial segregation provisions.  17 LA. REV 
STAT. § 331, et. seq., repealed, 1960 (1st Ex. Sess.) LA. ACTS Ch. 9. 
48
 Compare, ‘Governor Asks Punishment For Those Who Break Law’, Morning Advocate (Baton Rouge, 
La.), 9 May 1968, 7-F; with, Texas v Johnson, 491 US 397 (1989). 
49
 Holly Devor, ‘Reed Erickson and The Erickson Educational Foundation’, <http://web.uvic.ca/ 
~erick123/> (last visited 23 September 2004). 
50
 Even so, I would not be surprised to learn that the EEF conferred as to language specifics of the 
proposal. 
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In an article on the birth certificate bill in the June 28th edition of the Morning 
Advocate, it was noted: ‘Sponsors explained that the birth certificate change is 
needed by a woman, formerly a man, who desires to get married.’51  Quite obvi-
ously then, the bill was spurred by the predicament of a male-to-female transsexual, 
not a female-to-male – Erickson or any other.  And, if a news item from earlier in 
the session is any indication,52 the woman in question was Debra Majeau, whose 
effort to secure transition recognition was mentioned in Douglas K. Smith’s still-
influential 1971 Cornell Law Review article on transsexualism and the law,53 
(though without any indication of her apparent role in getting the law enacted.)  
Perhaps more significantly, however, the above-quoted sentence clearly indicates 
that the intended effect of the bill would be to allow those who transition to be 
regarded for purposes of marriage as members of their post-transition sex. 
 
The House debate on the bill appears to have been replete with a significant amount 
of commentary, evidently intended as humorous, that probably would be regarded 
today as either politically incorrect or downright offensive.  Rep. William Boyd of 
Lake Charles even ‘chided his colleagues for not considering the bill seriously.’54  
Rep. Chris Faser had gone so far as to introduce what was characterised as a "gag" 
amendment to the bill: ‘The provisions of this bill shall not apply to Rep. Speedy 
Boudreaux of Baton Rouge.’55  Even one of the bill's sponsors, freshman Rep. John 
J. Hainkel of New Orleans, remarked: ‘I just want to announce that Jesuit High 
School now has its first female graduate.’56 
 
To reiterate, I'm sure that much of what was said on the floor of the Louisiana 
House of Representatives that day might now be regarded as offensive.  But, the 
quote from Rep. Hainkel should give one an idea of what the outcome was as to the 
pertinent issue, namely the bill that was under consideration.  He was sincerely 
referring to a bill serious that had passed. 
 
According to one article it had passed the House unanimously, though another listed 
the vote tally as 87-8 – still an overwhelming endorsement.57 And, it went on to be 
passed by the Senate – unanimously – and approved by Gov John McKeithen,58 
                                                        
51
 ‘Mirthful Exchanges Accompany House Sex-Switch Bill Okay’, Morning Advocate (Baton Rouge, 
La.), 28 June 1968, 17-A (emphasis added). 
52
 ‘“He’s a “She”’, But Records Not Changed, Morning Advocate (Baton Rouge, La.), 4 May 1968, 8-B. 
53
 Douglas K Smith, ‘Transsexualism, Sex Reassignment Surgery, and the Law’ (1971) 56 Cornell Law 
Review 963. 
54
 ‘Mirthful Exchanges’, above n  51, 17-A. 
55
 Ibid. 
56
 Ibid.  This actually should not necessarily be viewed as offensive; more than a few MTFs who at-
tended all-male institutions pre-transition have made similar comments about themselves. 
57
 ‘Mirthful Exchanges’, above n 51, 17-A; ‘Louisiana Legislative Digest’, Morning Advocate (Baton 
Rouge, La.), 28 June 1968, 16-A (noting the 87-8 tally). 
58
 1968 LA. ACTS Ch. 611; ‘Louisiana Legislative Digest’, Morning Advocate (Baton Rouge, La.), 7 
July 1968, 16-A (noting the Senate vote of 38-0); and ‘List Bills Signed, Constitutional Amendments’, 
Morning Advocate (Baton Rouge, La.), 27 July 1968, 13-A, 15-A (noting the governor’s signing of H.B. 
1224). 
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removing any question as to whether the law and public policy of Louisiana recog-
nises the medico-legal concept of transsexualism.59  Neither the Legislature nor 
Louisiana's courts have ever seen fit to eliminate the state's sodomy statute, how-
ever.60  And, in 1999, the state even enacted a state anti-gay marriage statute.61 
Unanimously.62 
 
 
C The Other Birth Certificate Statutes 
Now, as eager as one might be to assume that the 1968 Louisiana statute simply 
must have been the first transsexual birth certificate statute,63 it was not; nor was it 
even the second.  By June of 1968, there were already two such statutes in force.  
Arizona's had been enacted the previous year64 and Illinois enacted its statute in 
1961.65  As of 2004, approximately half of the state-level jurisdictions in the United 
States have such statutes, meaning (and this is the important concept for transsexu-
als to grasp) that this half of America's jurisdictions have, via their elected represen-
tatives, recognised the medical reality of transsexualism and recognised it in law as 
a positive element of their public policy. 
 
Those two words are critical. 
 
They are increasingly being incorporated into anti-gay marriage statutes in an effort 
to insulate them from honest ‘full faith and credit’ analysis pursuant to Article IV of 
the U.S. Constitution. Significantly, pro-transsexual public policy exists in more 
than just those three states – even where there is clear anti-gay public policy (pur-
ported public policy at least.) 
 
                                                        
59
 The statute: 
Any person born in Louisiana who has sustained sex reassignment or corrective surgery 
which has changed the anatomical structure of the sex of the individual to that of a sex other 
than that which appears on the original birth certificate of the individual, may petition a court 
of competent jurisdiction as provided in this Section to obtain a new certificate of birth. 
is still in effect and is codified at: LA. REV. STAT. § 40:62 (A) (2004). 
60
 State v Smith, 766 So 2d 501 (La, 2000). 
61
 1999 LA. ACTS. Ch. 890. 
62
 1999 LA. H.B. 1450 (final House vote: 95-0, with 8 absent; final Senate vote: 32-0, with 7 absent). 
63
 In fact, several years ago and before I began doing extensive research into all of the state transsexual 
statutes, I asserted as much at a Panel at the National Lesbian-Gay Law Association Conference in 
Dallas.  Knowledge is good.  More knowledge is better – if it is reasonably accurate. 
64
 1967 ARIZ. LAWS Ch. 77, § 2.  This was shortly before future US Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor became a member of the Arizona Senate, so, unfortunately, the vote tally from this does not 
offer any direct insight into how she might deal with transsexuals’ identity and marital rights when they 
finally do make it to the high court.  She did, however, cast a vote in 1973 for a bill that added language 
to an adjoining section of the vital statistics act, so she should be presumed to have at least cast her eyes 
near the language of a transsexual birth certificate statute.  See 1973 ARIZ. LAWS Ch. 51; and 1973 
Arizona Senate Journal 301 (14 March 1973). 
65
 1961 ILL. LAWS p. 2935 § 17.  Notably, although the governor who signed this provision into law 
was a Democrat, both houses of the legislature that passed the measure were controlled by the Republi-
cans.  ‘Senate Organizes’, Illinois Legislative Bulletin, 4 January 1961, 1; ‘House Action’, Illinois 
Legislative Bulletin, 4 January 1961, 1. 
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Jurisdiction Year of Enactment of 
Statute Recognising 
Transsexualism 
Year of Enactment of 
Statute Attacking the 
Concept of Gay 
Marriage 
Any Evidence of Any Connection 
Between the Two so as to Equate 
Public Policy Against Gay Mar-
riage With a Public Policy Against 
Transsexuals? 
Alabama 
 
1992 
 
(1992 Ala. Acts No. 
92-607, §19) 
1998 † 
Arkansas 
 
1981 
 
(1981 Ark. Acts No. 
120, §12) 
1997 / 2004 1981: My review of the Arkansas 
Democrat from the time of the 
birth certificate enactment indicates 
no coverage of the bill. 
2004: Transsexuals’ rights absent 
from discourse on anti-same-sex-
marriage ballot measure. 
Arizona 1967 
 
(1967 Ariz. Laws Ch. 
77, § 2) 
1996 † 
California 1977 
 
(1977 Cal. Laws Ch. 
1087) 
1977 / 2000 1977: Concept raised, but trans-
sexuals' marital rights not deni-
grated by the plain language of the 
anti-gay bill or the subsequent 
transsexual birth certificate bill. 
1997: Gender transition recognised 
at trial court level in Vecchione v 
Vecchione divorce action; no 
appellate or legislative response 
against it. 
2000: Transsexuals' rights totally 
absent from Prop. 22 discourse. 
2004: Current discourse regarding 
San Francisco gay marriages is 
totally devoid of any mention of 
heterosexual marriages involving 
transsexuals. 
Colorado 1984 
 
(1984 Colo. Laws 
Ch. 206) 
2000 See infra, Part IV, C, 2. 
Connecticut* 1975* / 2001* none † 
                                                        
*
 The non-transsexual-specific birth certificate statutes in Connecticut and Puerto Rico were held by 
court decision to be inclusive of transsexuals' identity rights. Darnell v Lloyd, 395 F Supp. 1210 (D 
Conn, 1975); Ex Parte Torres, 2000 JTS 120, 2000 TSPR 109 (PR, 2000). The decisions have never 
been overturned by statute or subsequent court decision.  Moreover, Connecticut has since amended its 
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D.C. 1981 
 
(1981 D.C. Laws No. 
4-34, §18) 
none / 1996  
(Federal DOMA) 
† 
Georgia 1982 
 
(1982 Ga. Acts No. 
1216, §1) 
1996 / 2004 2004: Transsexuals’ rights absent 
from discourse on anti-same-sex-
marriage ballot measure. 
Guam (I have been un-able 
to ascertain when the 
Guam statute was 
enacted.) 
none / 1996 
(Federal DOMA) 
† 
Hawaii 1973 
 
(1973 Haw. Acts No. 
39) 
1998 1993-1998: Baehr litigation and its 
aftermath totally devoid of any 
reference to marital rights of trans-
sexuals. 
Illinois 1961 
 
(1961 Ill. Laws p. 
2935, §17) 
1996 1978: Penumbral reading of the 
1961 statute in City of Chicago v 
Wilson, but question of transsexu-
als’ marital rights not discussed. 
Iowa 1976 
 
(1976 Iowa Laws Ch. 
1111) 
1998 1976: No press coverage of the 
birth certificate statute. 
1978-80: No mention of marital 
rights during Pinneke v Preisser 
SRS funding litigation. 
1998: Amendment introduced 
during DOMA battle, but no plain 
language in statute denigrating 
rights flowing from the 1976 birth 
certificate statute. 
Kentucky 1990 
 
(1990 Ky. Acts Ch. 
369, §23) 
1998 / 2004 † 
Louisiana 1968 
 
(1968 La. Acts. Ch. 
611) 
1999 / 2004 See infra Part III, B 
Maryland 1995 1973 2003: State high court dodges the 
                                                                                                                                 
vital statistics statutory framework to address "gender change," 2001 CONN. ACTS Ch. 01-163, § 32; 
after briefly having a statute only addressing only gender changes related to "hermaphroditism." 1997 
(18 June Sp. Sess.) CONN. ACTS. 97-10, § 3; 1997 (18 June Sp. Sess.) CONN. ACTS. 97-8, § 44. 
The then-non-transsexual-specific birth certificate statute in Massachusetts was construed in an attorney 
general's opinion to be inclusive of transsexuals' identity rights.  1975 Mass. AG Op 62.  It was amended 
to be transsexual-specific in 1981 (the year after long-time opponent of including the transgendered in 
federal employment antidiscrimination legislation Barney Frank left the Massachusetts legislature to go 
to Congress.)  1981 MASS. ACTS. Ch. 684. 
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(1995 Md. Laws Ch. 
97) 
issue in In re Heilig. 
Massachusetts 1975* / 1981 
 
(1981 Mass. Acts Ch. 
684) 
none 1975: Pre-statutory pro-transsexual 
Attorney General’s opinion in-
cludes no marital limitation 
2001-2004: Goodridge litigation 
completely devoid of any reference 
to marital rights of transsexuals. 
Michigan 1978 
 
(1978 Mich. Pub. 
Acts No. 368) 
1996 / 2004 † 
Missouri 1984 
 
(1984 Mo. Laws S.B. 
574) 
1996*** / 2001 / 2004 † 
Nebraska 1994 2000 2000: Discourse regarding the anti-
gay-marriage Initiative 416 appears 
to have totally ignored the issue of 
marital rights of transsexuals. 
New Mexico 1981 
 
(1981 N.M. Laws Ch. 
309, §19) 
none † 
New Jersey 1976** / 1984 
 
(1984 N.J. Laws Ch. 
191) 
none 1976: No indication of any popular 
link between the issue of gay 
marriage and the recognition of 
gender transition in M.T. v J.T.; 
news coverage is scant, but re-
spectful; the decision is viewed as 
recognition of the reality of sex, 
not a threat to the institution of 
marriage. 
2001-present: Ongoing gay mar-
riage litigation attacks the aspect of 
                                                        
***
 The 1996 Missouri DOMA statute was declared unconstitutional for violating the anti-logrolling 
provision of the Missouri Constitution.  St. Louis Health Care Network v State, 968 SW 2d 145 (Mo, 
1998).  However, there is no indication whatsoever that either enactment – or the recently-enacted 
constitutional amendment – had any target other than homosexual relationships. 
Civil marriage in this state shall consist only of the union of one man and one woman. In this 
state no effect shall be given to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other 
state, territory, or possession of the United States, Indian tribe, or foreign nation, respecting a 
relationship of any union other than a union of one man and one woman that is treated as a 
marriage under the laws of such other jurisdiction, or a right or claim arising from such a rela-
tionship. 
2004 MO. H.J.R. 39. 
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the pro-transsexual M.T. v J.T. 
decision holding that marriage is 
limited to opposite-sex couples. 
North Carolina 1975 
 
(1975 N.C. Laws Ch. 
556) 
1996 † 
Oregon 1981 
 
(1981 Or. Laws Ch. 
221, §1) 
2004 1998: Failed initiative, 'The Family 
Act', would have mandated that 
‘gender is determined at the mo-
ment of conception.’ 
Puerto Rico 2000* none / 1996 
(federal DOMA) 
† 
Utah 1981 
 
(1981 Utah Laws Ch. 
126, §3) 
1995 / 2004 2004: Transsexuals’ rights absent 
from discourse on anti-same-sex-
marriage ballot measure.  
Virginia 1979 
 
(1979 Va. Acts Ch. 
711) 
1997 1979: No explicitly anti-marriage 
language. 
1985-86: Attorney General’s 
opinion on the birth certificate 
statute (1985-86 Va. A.G. Op. 182) 
gives no indication of lack of 
marital rights. 
2004: Transsexuals’ rights absent 
from discourse on broad anti-same-
sex statutory measure. 
Wisconsin 1985 
 
(1985 Wis. Acts. Ch. 
315) 
none 1985: No hint of denigration of 
marital rights in legislative history 
of birth certificate statute. 
1997: A proposed amendment to a 
DOMA proposal would have 
clarified that the bill would not 
have adversely affected heterosex-
ual marriages involving transsexu-
als. 
2003: Vetoed DOMA bill had no 
language aimed at heterosexual 
marriages involving transsexuals. 
 
                                                                                                                                 
**
 Transsexuals' identity AND post-transition marital rights were recognised in 1976 by a court decision 
specifically upholding the concept of opposite-sex-only marriage. M.T. v J.T., 355 A2d 204 (NJ Super 
App Div, 1976), cert. denied, 364 A2d 1076 (1976).  This decision has not only never been overturned, 
but a statute specifying that New Jersey-born transsexuals can correct their birth certificates to reflect 
post-transition reality was enacted in 1984.  1984 NJ LAWS Ch. 191. 
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† Indicates that though I have not found any indication in legislative 
documents or published decisional law evidencing any intent to target 
transsexuals with DOMAs, I have yet to complete sufficient analysis of 
popular discourse (typically, newspaper coverage of the legislative ses-
sions at issue) to feel comfortable offering any conclusion other than that 
logically mandated by the plain language of the statutes – namely, that 
transsexuals’ post-transition marital rights are intended by the birth certifi-
cate statutes and are not negatively targeted by the anti-gay-marriage stat-
utes. 
 
 
 
IV THE 2004 CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, ET. AL. 
 
A Louisiana 
 
Marriage in the state of Louisiana shall consist only of the union of one 
man and one woman. No official or court of the state of Louisiana shall 
construe this constitution or any state law to require that marriage or the 
legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any member of a union other 
than the union of one man and one woman. A legal status identical or sub-
stantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be 
valid or recognised. No official or court of the state of Louisiana shall rec-
ognise any marriage contracted in any other jurisdiction which is not the 
union of one man and one woman.66 
 
 
Although I will discuss a second potential effect of the public policy embodied in 
Louisiana’s 1968 transsexual birth certificate statute in Part V, the most obvious 
and immediate effect of it is that transsexuals born there should face no obstacles in 
obtaining state recognition of their transitions and those in (or seeking to enter into) 
heterosexual marriages there should have no problem having those marriages rec-
ognised in Louisiana even after the enactment of the anti-same-sex marriage 
amendment – whose language is italicised above.  The Senate sponsor of the 
amendment was Senator John Hainkel – the same man who, 36 years earlier, as a 
freshman representative, spearheaded the passage of the birth certificate statute.  
And, as shown earlier, it was enacted specifically in response to an MTF constituent 
who had been blocked from obtaining a marriage license because of the male desig-
nation on her birth certificate.   
 
                                                        
66
 Kevin McGill, ‘Same-Sex Marriage Proposal a Wordy Proposition’, The Advocate (Baton Rouge, La.), 
13 September 2004 <http://2theadvocate.com/stories/091304/ opi_samesex001.shtml> (quoting the 2004 
ballot proposal’s language).  Note: this newspaper is the same one referenced for the 1968 events; it 
simply no longer is referred to as the Morning Advocate.  It should not be confused with the national gay 
newsmagazine also called The Advocate. 
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The upshot? 
 
Hainkel’s obvious knowledge of the difference between same-sex marriage and a 
heterosexual marriage involving a transsexual equates to clear legislative intent 
from 1968 by the state of Louisiana to allow post-transition transsexuals to marry 
members of their pre-transition sex.  This combined with the continued existence of 
the 1968 statute during the enactment of the state DOMA statute in 1999, the re-
peated assertions of legislators during debates leading up to the submission of the 
2004 proposal that if enacted it would simply solidify existing law, and the absolute 
absence of transsexuals’ rights from the discourse surrounding the measure,67 
should mean that, the approval of the amendment by the voters translates to trans-
sexuals’ marital rights having been enshrined in Louisiana’s Constitution.68   
 
Of course, almost immediately, gays in Louisiana sued, initially appearing to be 
successful,69 to overturn the amendment (their claim is that the measure addressed 
more than one subject – gay marriage and domestic partnership – in contravention 
of the prescribed method of amending the state’s constitution.70)  Consequently, it is 
not inaccurate to say that gays have overturned transsexuals’ constitutionally-
enshrined Louisiana marital rights. 
 
Inflammatory? 
 
Possibly.  But, objectively, can it actually be said that this any more inflammatory 
than the gay-dictated, top-down “incremental progress” was insulting to the trans-
gendered? 
 
 
 
  
                                                        
67
 For example, an opinion piece prior to the election expressed the following concerns over the expan-
sive language: 
Could an elderly gay man be denied a contract granting him next-of-kin visitation rights when 
his longtime partner is dying in a hospital? Could an employer's decision to extend medical 
benefits to an employee's same-sex partner be nullified? Would the amendment affect custody 
rights of gays and lesbians? 
McGill, above n  66.  Nowhere in the piece were transsexuals mentioned. 
68
 Although the vote was allowed to take place, there was an admonition from its Chief Justice that the 
proposal might be violative of the state’s ‘single subject’ requirement for ballot measures.  Doug Simp-
son, ‘Voters Will Cast Ballots on Gay Marriage Ban’, The Advocate (Baton Rouge, La.), 2 September 
2004, <http://2theadvocate.com/stories/090204/new_voteongay001.shtml> (last visited 14 September 
2004). 
Apparently marriage was at least touched upon in 1968, but not post-transition heterosexual marriages.  
The Baton Rouge Morning Advocate indicated a floor amendment to the 1968 birth certificate bill “to 
make a person married to [a transsexual utilising the birth certificate conformation provisions of the act] 
a necessary [party] to the lawsuit involved.”  ‘Louisiana Legislative Digest’, above n 57. 
69
 Louisiana Supreme Court Agrees To Hear Gay Marriage Appeal, 365gay.com, 14 October 2004 
<http://www.365gay.com/newscon04/10/101404laSupreme.htm>. 
70
 Simpson, above n 66. 
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B Before Louisiana: Congress 
 
In a very real sense it is impossible for a man to marry a man or a woman 
to marry a woman.  The very meaning of the word marriage necessarily 
contemplates a relationship between a man and a woman.  For nearly 228 
years every state in the union has followed this millennia-old tradition.  
Not once in the history of this nation have the people, speaking through 
their elected representatives or otherwise, passed a single law altering this 
tradition in the slightest way. 
… 
 
It goes without saying that for thousands of years of human history, until 
recently, marriage has, at all times and at all places, been reserved as the 
union between male and female.  In the American experience from the be-
ginning of the Republic until last month, there was – there has never been 
a same-sex marriage.  Even then, it took four members of a lawless court 
to impose a same-sex marriage on the people.  The people of Massachu-
setts did not seek such a law, and they do not want it.71 
 
However much that the religionist opportunists,72 such as Colorado Representative 
Marilyn Musgrave (who made the statements above), who are pushing the Federal 
Marriage Amendment73 and the so-called Marriage Protection Act74 (intended to 
remove interpretation of the 1996 DOMA from the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts) may – or may not – desire for heterosexual transsexual marriages to be 
wiped out as if they were same-sex marriage when75 the amendment becomes part 
of the U.S. Constitution or when the statute passes (or both), they must contend 
with a formidable opponent: history.  And, if courts interpreting either (or both) 
exhibit even the slightest degree of interpretational honesty, they will come to the 
conclusion that such marriages were not targeted by either – or by the federal 
DOMA which preceded them. 
And, they will have to contend with statements such as Musgrave’s above – and 
many others. 
 
                                                        
71
 Hearing on the Proposed Federal Marriage Amendment, U.S. Senate, Judiciary Committee (22 June 
2004) (testimony of Rep. Marilyn Musgrave) (audio recording on file with author). 
72
 And no objective look at the political landscape can yield any conclusion other than that those pushing 
these proposals do not care in the slightest about ‘defending’ marriage (whatever that might actually 
entail) but, instead, care deeply about electing religionist Republicans to office – particularly the office 
of the presidency.  In fact, the biggest fight in the Louisiana Legislature in 2004 over gay marriage was 
not the amendment per se but whether or not the vote would be in September (as ultimately occurred) or 
on the day of the November general election, when the increased conservative Christian turnout for the 
anti-gay vote would benefit the Christian religionist incumbent president, George W Bush. 
73
 2004 S.J. Res. 30, 108th Cong, 2nd Sess. (22 March 2004); 2004 S.J. Res. 40, 108th Cong, 2nd Sess. (7 
July 2004). 
74
 2003 H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. 1st Sess. (16 October 2003). 
75
 Pessimistic as it may be, for that I must say “when”, not “if.” 
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1 1996, et. al. 
In 1996, as the DOMA proposal was approaching passage, Dana Priesing, a MTF 
transsexual attorney then with GenderPAC, asserted that it was ‘unclear…whether 
Congress intended DOMA to reach back to invalidate marriages in which the 
spouses were of opposite sexes when  the marriage was performed, but are mem-
bers of the same sex now.’76  The reality is that Congress appears never to have 
broached the subject of this specific type of same-sex marriage. 
 
Far more significant, however, is the extent to which Congress addressed the valid-
ity under DOMA of a heterosexual marriage between two individuals who, at their 
respective births, were designated as being members of the same sex, though, by the 
time of the marriage, one of whom had undergone SRS and become recognised as a 
member of the sex opposite of the other person - in other words, what the average 
person would think of as a marriage that might involve a transsexual and what 
indeed is type of marriage at issue in the vast majority of cases involving 'transsex-
ual marriages.' 
 
The extent to which this was discussed? 
 
Not at all. 
 
Although 39 states now have some form of state law or constitutional provision 
which can be referred to as a mini-DOMA, the mother of all DOMAs is that passed 
by the U.S. Congress in 1996.77  In light of the current very real possibility of 
DOMA's ‘take’ on marriage becoming part of the U.S. Constitution, it is essential 
that not just transsexuals but also legal practitioners and members of the judiciary 
(not just in America but in all nations that may refer to U.S. law) have the clearest 
understanding possible of precisely what was, and what was not, being targeted by 
Congress in 1996 – and why. 
 
If the purported clear public policy against same-sex marriage on which anti-
transition-recognition courts (such as those in Texas, Kansas, Ohio and Florida) 
have hung their hats is a politico-legal construct which truly encompasses, in the 
negative (e.g., exclusion from the right to marriage) sense, a heterosexual marriage 
involving a transsexual and a non-transsexual of that person's pre-transition sex, 
then one would think not only that at least one of the now-39 enacted DOMAs 
would have explicitly mentioned transsexuals in its actual statutory language78 but 
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 Dana Priesing, ‘DOMA, The Transgendered and Marriage’, Transgender Tapestry, Fall 1996, 6, 47. 
77
 Act of 21 September 1996, P.L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419. 
78
 Not even the now-enacted Ohio 'SuperDOMA', which Judge Diane Grendell, in In re Nash and Barr, 
above n 28, improperly relied upon prior to its enactment, explicitly mentions transsexuals.  Spencer 
Hunt, ‘Gay-Marriage Fight Won't End’, Cincinnati Enquirer, 6 February 2004, 1, 2004 WL 57343625; 
Stephen Ohlemacher, ‘Taft Defends Gay Marriage Ban’, Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio), 7 February 
2004, B3, 2004 WL 57886333; Lee Leonard and Mark Ellis, ‘Taft Signs Law Banning Gay Marriage, 
Heads Off Possible Court Challenge’, Columbus Dispatch (Ohio), 7 February 2004, 1A, 2004 WL 
56491893.  Previous Ohio DOMA bills did refer to In re Ladrach in their supporting documents - but 
only for the general anti-gay marriage proposition, and NOT addressing the salient pro-transsexual 
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also that during each and every legislative debate on the issue of same-sex marriage 
since New Jersey’s Appellate Division recognised such marriages as opposite-sex in 
M.T. v J.T. in 1976 - and, particularly during the 1996 debates on the federal 
DOMA - that the obvious conflict between what New Jersey viewed as a heterosex-
ual marriage in M.T. and what other states view as a heterosexual marriage not only 
would have been discussed but would have been front-and-centre right along with 
Hawaii given that, unlike Hawaii, a pro-transsexual final decision (and almost two 
dozen transsexual birth certificate statutory enactments) had already come into 
being! 
 
Far too many other courts have totally misconstrued the true meaning of transsexual 
birth certificate statutes.  Although such statutes are ministerial and/or judicial 
mechanisms for correcting information on a transsexual's birth certificate to reflect 
post-transition reality, all such statutes also reflect the undeniable recognition, by 
the legislative body of the jurisdiction, of the reality of transsexualism irrespective 
of whether they are accompanied by a clear historical record similar to Louisiana’s. 
This logical construct was recently cited in a brief to a Virginia federal court on 
behalf of an MTF prisoner suing the state for refusing to provide any transition 
related healthcare, and is viewed as being at least partially responsible for the Vir-
ginia Department of Corrections settling the case.79 
 
The state-level jurisdictions which have statutorily recognised the concept of a legal 
change of sex do not form some small, liberal, elite cadre of north-eastern and/or 
'left-coast' states seeking to impose their will on the vast majority of the states.  As 
can be gathered from the chart in Part III C, it is a group - numbering just under half 
of the state-level jurisdictions in the United States - spread evenly across the widest 
cross-section of the nation imaginable: Northeast, Northwest, Southwest, Midwest 
and even the Deep South; states thought of as liberal, states thought of as moderate 
and states which are unquestionably conservative.  Some of these statutes were 
passed after their respective states enacted anti-gay-marriage laws,80 some long 
prior.  A not-insignificant number of them came into being prior to 1976's M.T. v 
J.T., and some after,81 mandating an assumption that those states had knowledge of 
legally-recognised heterosexual marriages involving a transsexual and a member of 
                                                                                                                                 
Ladrach dicta of Judge Denny Clunk, the individual judge who decided Ladrach.  In other words, 
nothing is said about any purported pubic policy against recognition of out-of-state conformed birth 
certificates. 
79
 Amicus Brief of Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association, Inc., in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment at ¶¶ 31-32, De'Lonta v Angelone, No. C.A. #7:99-CV-
00642 (WD Va, 2004).  Full disclosure: I was a signatory to the brief and contributed this portion of the 
legal argument therein. The case had been remanded to the district court by: De’Lonta v Anglone, 330 F 
3d 630 (4th Cir, 2003).  The settlement agreement was reached in late September 2004.  ‘Virginia Agrees 
to Treat Transsexual Inmates’, Daily Press (Hampton Roads, Va.), 24 September 2004. 
80
 Most recently, Maryland, whose anti-gay marriage statute was enacted in 1973 and whose transsexual 
birth certificate statute was enacted in 1995.  Compare 1973 MD. LAWS Ch. 213; with 1995 MD. 
LAWS Ch. 97.  Also, see generally, Part III C. 
81
 It appears as though all of the states with such statutes except Illinois (1961), Arizona (1967), Louisi-
ana (1968), Hawaii (1973), North Carolina (1975) and Iowa (12 February 1976) enacted their statutes 
after the New Jersey Appellate Division's decision in M.T. v J.T.  See Chart, Part III C.  Still, this 
represents roughly one-fourth of the statutes. 
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her former legal sex.82  Some of these statutes were passed after their respective 
states repealed or otherwise nullified sodomy statutes, some prior; some, such as 
Missouri and Louisiana, still had active, enforceable sodomy statutes as of June 26, 
2003, when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Lawrence v Texas.83 
 
Only one state has ever purported to legislatively deny transsexuals' the ability to 
live unimpeded by documentation which, by virtue of gender transition, has become 
false.  That state is Tennessee, not Texas, Kansas or Ohio.84  Moreover, if the Ten-
nessee anti-transsexual language is accorded the same constrictive interpretation 
that the word "sex" is given by courts construing Title VII against transsexuals, then 
even that statute should be interpreted only to prohibit the amendment of the birth 
certificate and not as a rejection of the concept of transsexualism (in marriage or in 
any other context.85) Both were floor amendments to larger bills that received very 
little real consideration.  Beyond this even, my research into the origin of this provi-
sion, which did occur approximately one year after M.T. v J.T.,86 reveals no public 
concern in Tennessee about either the M.T. decision or the anti-transsexual birth 
certificate language.  Neither appears to have rated any mention whatsoever in the 
major newspaper of the Tennessee state capitol of Nashville, The Tennessean.87 
 
This leads to the question of whether M.T. v J.T., or any other transsexual case / 
statute might have played a role in spurring the passage of the federal DOMA. 
 
                                                        
82
 There should also be a mandatory assumption that Kansas had, or should have had, knowledge of M.T. 
v J.T. by the time of its first anti-gay-marriage law in 1980 - a law heavily relied upon in Gardiner - and 
could have included language explicitly excluding M.T. v J.T.-esque marriages along with homosexual 
ones but did not do so. ‘The legislature is presumed to act with knowledge of relevant judicial decisions.’ 
In re Huerta, 41 P 2d 814, 821 (Kan, 2002) (quoting Johnson City Education Ass’n v U.S.D. No. 475, 
955 P 2d 1266 (1998)).  Although M.T. occurred outside of Kansas, M.T. is all but conclusive as to any 
discussion as to whether transsexuals were targeted by any anti-gay-marriage legislation passed in the 
years immediately afterward and which did not statutorily specify that transsexuals were targeted. 
83
 Totally ignored in the Lawrence v Texas litigation (as well as by the court which decided Littleton v 
Prange) was that, in a previous challenge to the law declared unconstitutional in 2003, the state of Texas 
had put forth even the very possibility of undergoing a "surgical sex change" in an attempt to prove that a 
gay man did not have standing to challenge the law which criminalised certain activity only between 
members of the same sex.  Baker v Wade, 553 F Supp. 1121, 1147 (ND Tex, 1982), appeal dism’d 743 F 
2d 236 (5th Cir, 1984), rev’d on reh’g 769 F 2d 289 (5th Cir, 1985), cert. denied, 478 US 1022 (1986). 
84
 TENN. CODE  ANN. § 68-3-203 (d) (1999). 
85
 Obviously, the Legislature could have included marriage-specific discriminatory language, but did not.  
This is not merely word/intent-parsing as, obviously, there are likely to be transsexuals in every state 
who were born in other states. 
86
 1977 TENN. ACTS Ch. 128, § 21. 
87
 I have reviewed the Tennessean from March of 1976.  Although there was one article about a trans-
gendered person (a prostitute in Miami), which actually appeared the day prior to the M.T. decision, 
nothing transgender-related (much less transsexual-related) appeared in the March 23rd issue.  ‘Officer 
Discovers 'Ugly' She Was He’, The Tennessean, 21 March 1976, 20-A.  The front page of the March 23rd 
issue did include, in addition to hard news items, no less than two entertainment-related items: one on 
Hank Williams, Jr;, and one on Andy Williams’ ex-wife Claudine Longet.  George Watson, Jr., ‘Hank 
Williams 'Fine' After Forehead Surgery’, The Tennessean, 23 March 1976, 1-A; ‘Claudine Now Facing 
Charges in Shooting’, The Tennessean, 23 March 1976, 1-A. 
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2 Looking For M.T. 
Even vehemently anti-gay-marriage commentators, in attempting to prove that 'the 
people' could not possibly envision marriage as anything other than a union be-
tween one man and one woman, have, for their proposition cited M.T. v J.T. - a case 
which as explicitly as can be imagined declared that a heterosexual marriage be-
tween a post-surgical transsexual and a person of the transsexual's pre-transition sex 
was not a same-sex marriage.88  Going back further, one can find absolutely no 
mention in the legislative history of the federal DOMA of concern over legal recog-
nition of such a marriage. 
 
Neither the majority report nor the dissenting report of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee say anything whatsoever about (for or against) the idea of the marriage in 
M.T. v J.T. – or any heterosexual marriage involving a transsexual from any of the 
states which had by then statutorily recognised the concept of transsexualism – 
being considered an opposite-sex marriage.  The majority report even states, in 
language that could not be more unequivocal, that that bill was ‘a response to a very 
particular development in the State of Hawaii.’89  And, that development in Hawaii 
was most certainly not the recognition of transsexualism by that state's legislature in 
1973.90 
 
It was the Baehr litigation.  
 
In committee, Senator Orrin Hatch said that the DOMA bill ‘responds to several 
key questions’: whether there was a ‘serious practical problem’ that Congress 
needed to address (his answer: the Hawaii litigation); whether the 3-2 majority of 
the Hawaii Supreme Court can force other states ‘to alter radically the concept of 
marriage’ (his answer: yes; this obviously still refers to Baehr); and whether 
DOMA would be a ‘legitimate exercise of Congress' power.’91  Senator Don Nick-
les, in response to comments from Senator Ted Kennedy regarding Kennedy's 
                                                        
88
 See Katherine Shaw Spaht, ‘Beyond Baehr: Strengthening The Definition of Marriage’, (1998) 12  
Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law 277, 285-86.  Spaht, a Louisiana State University law 
professor, is a supporter of the Louisiana anti-gay-marriage amendment.  Kevin McGill, ‘Senate Panel  
OKs Gay Marriage Ban’, The Advocate (Baton Rouge, La.), 4 May 2004,  
Available on-line at: <http://2theadvocate.com/stories/ 050404/new_notogay001.shtml> (last visited 11 
May 2004).  
89
 H. Rep. No. 104-664 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2907.  Both Rep. Charles Canady, in the 
House Judiciary Subcommittee hearing on DOMA, and Sen. Orrin Hatch, in the Senate Judiciary 
Committee hearing, led off their respective hearings by referring specifically - and only - to the then-
ongoing Hawaii Baehr same-sex marriage litigation. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Constitu-
tion of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess., on H..R. 3396, 
at 2 (15 May 1996) (Serial No. 69) (hereinafter 1996 House Hearing); Hearing Before the Committee on 
the Judiciary, Senate, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess., on S. 1740, at 1 (11 July 1996) (Serial No. J-104-90) 
(hereinafter 1996 Senate Hearing). 
90
 1973 HAW. ACTS. No. 39, codified at HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 338-17.7 (West 2003).  
91
 Senate Committee Hearing, 1-2 (statement of Sen. Hatch).   
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characterisation of the DOMA bill as intolerant as well as Kennedy’s proposed 
attachment of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act92 to the bill, stated: 
 
I didn't instigate the Hawaii decision.  I didn't file the petition before the court in 
Hawaii.  I wasn't the President's liaison to the homosexual activists that is talking 
about gay marriages - or same sex marriages.  So the timing of this was really 
brought about by the Hawaiian decision and by several activists that want to have 
same-sex marriages recognised throughout the country.93 
 
Nickles indeed did not instigate the Baehr decision.  But, likewise, neither did 
transsexuals.  As a general proposition, transgendered people have historically been 
all but totally excluded from gay rights policymaking, even when such policymak-
ing is declared to be in the name of not just gays, lesbians and bisexuals but also the 
transgendered.  Transsexuals have never been allowed to testify at any of the hear-
ings which have been held concerning adding a non-transgender-inclusively-
defined "sexual orientation" to the categories addressed by federal employment 
anti-discrimination law. 94  Few transsexuals have ever been employed by any of the 
major gay rights organisations - the organisations that, historically, have played 
major roles both in developing the trans-non-inclusive track record of civil rights 
legislation and in spearheading the modern gay marriage pushes.95 
 
Apparently, the only time that the word "transsexual" appeared in the Congres-
sional Record during the 104th Congress, of 1995-96, was NOT during floor debates 
over DOMA, but in comments by Sen. Dan Coats on July 31, 1995, attacking the 
United Nations' Beijing Conference on the Status of Women, claiming that: 
 
When several delegates sought to define gender, their efforts were re-
buffed. Behind the scenes, it became evident that the meaning of gender 
had been expanded to include not just male and female, but transsexual, 
bisexual and homosexual.96 
                                                        
92
 An amendment which, like all federal gay employment anti-discrimination proposals which came 
before it and which have come after it, had it been successful, only would have protected homosexuals, 
heterosexuals and bisexuals, not transsexuals or any transgendered people. 
93
 Above n 91, 9-10 (emphasis added) (comment of Sen. Nickles).  
94
 Phyllis Randolph Frye, ‘Facing Discrimination, Organizing For Freedom: The Transgender Commu-
nity’, in John D’Emilio (ed), Creating Change (2000) 451, 462.  Ms. Frye and another transgender rights 
activist were, however, allowed to submit prepared written statements with respect to the 1994 ENDA 
hearing. Karen Ann Kerin, ‘Proposed Amendments to Civil Rights Law’, Senate Labour Committee (29 
July 1994), 1994 WL 392888 (F.D.C.H.); Phyllis Randolph Frye, ‘Federal "Sexual Orientation" Em-
ployment Bill Must Include the Transgendered’, Senate Labour Committee (29 July 1994), 1994 WL 
392889 (F.D.C.H.).   
95
 Cartwright, above n 29 (imploring HRC to ‘hire transgender-identified people as soon as possible for 
prominent, visible staff positions, preferably those that involve regular contact with legislators,’ some-
thing the organisation has a long history of not doing). 
96
 Congressional Record, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., at S10965. 
It must be noted that the Senator goes on to ponder, ‘I wonder how many Americans consider `gender' to 
be relative,’ followed by the assertion, ‘The definition of gender is sex, that is male or female, period’ 
This clearly indicates that the Senator is unwilling to acknowledge the existence of any form of intersex-
uality.  
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The only other occurrence of the word came via Sen. Jesse Helms the following day 
on the same subject.97  And, the word appears nowhere in House debate. 
 
The phrase "sex change" appears four times, only three of which actually involve 
transsexuals,98 though none of the four appear in any manner in connection with 
DOMA.99  Other transgender concepts appeared in the Congressional Record dur-
ing the 104th Congress, but none in connection with DOMA, and certainly not in 
connection with any scintilla of any possible hint that DOMA was intended to pre-
empt M.T. v J.T. or any effect of any transsexual birth certificate statute.  While 
clear that those who spoke on transgender issues that session despised transgen-
dered people, hate-filled talk does not equate to hate-filled action; passage by Con-
gress and presentment to the Executive Branch is required.100 
 
Referring back to the DOMA hearings, the broad category of transgendered people 
actually was mentioned, albeit non-substantively, in the prepared statement of the 
National Gay-Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF).  And, well-known right-wing extrem-
ist Gary Bauer mentioned "transvestites" in a hypothetical dealing not with DOMA 
itself but the attempt to attach ENDA to it.101  Bauer said nothing about transsexuals 
or transsexual marriage, however.  Likewise, neither did Jay Sekulow, counsel for 
the Pat Robertson-associated, right-wing American Center for Law and Justice 
(ACLJ),102 and a man who actually helped draft DOMA.103  Notably, Sekulow did 
quote from a New Jersey newspaper article about homosexuals awaiting the out-
come of the then-ongoing Hawaii litigation.104   
 
At the risk of sounding repetitive, the question as to transsexuals had by then been 
settled in New Jersey - and in favour of transsexuals.  Does it not seem reasonable, 
indeed rational, to believe that if the 1996 DOMA was intended to target that then-
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 Congressional Record, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.,  S11050.  
98
 The fourth occurred in a reprint of a Long Island Newsday article, and did not involve transsexuals 
but, rather, constituted part of a somewhat snide comment about lobbyists: ‘You can tell when something 
big is happening at the House Ways and Means Committee. The lobbyists all age by about 25 years and 
undergo sex-change operations, as the powerful replace the mere note-takers.’ Ibid. H11920 (8 Nov 
1995) (reprinting Marie Cocco, ‘The New Tax-Free Corporate Checking Account’, Newsday, 21 Sep-
tember 1995). 
99
 One involved Rep. Kingston complaining that Atlanta's Legal Aid Society had handled a case involv-
ing a transsexual's quest for Medicaid funding for SRS.  Congressional Record, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
H5494 (22 May 1996).  The other two were references to inmate suits for SRS.  Ibid. S3703; and 
S14629. 
100
 See generally, Clinton v City of New York, 524 US 417 (1998); and INS v Chadha, 462 US 919 
(1983). 
101
 It must be further noted that Bauer's example pertained to housing, something that has not been 
covered, even as to sexual orientation, by any of the ENDA bills.  Even the pre-ENDA Civil Rights Act 
amendment bills did not include housing, though many did include public accommodations, public 
facilities and educational opportunities.  See generally, H.R. 166, §§ 2-4, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). 
102
 1996 House Hearing at 214-28 (testimony and prepared statement of Jay Alan Sekulow).   
103
 CSPAN Television, Washington Journal, Same-Sex Marriage (12 July 2004) (call-in show featuring 
Sekulow and HRC's Cheryl Jacques) (copy on file with author). 
104
 1996 House Hearing at 223 (quoting ‘Will Hawaii Redefine Marriage?  N.J. Couples Eagerly Await 
Word’, The Record, 9 May 1996). 
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two-decade-old precedent (and all law in line with it from other states) or even if 
Sekulow and his organisation wanted DOMA to do so, then one of the most anti-
GLBT legal organisations in the country would have said something about it in a 
forum not only controlled by radically conservative Republicans but also in which 
even some of the most anti-DOMA voices, such as Sen. Ted Kennedy and Rep. 
Barney Frank, are well-known to be unfriendly to the transgender community?105 
There is, of course, only one logical answer. 
 
And yet, the evidence of trans-non-inclusion does not end with Sekulow. 
 
3 Testimony 
Pro-DOMA Professor Hadley Arkes stated bluntly of DOMA: ‘This statute upsets 
no judgment of the courts.’106 If this was a true statement on May 15, 1996, then 
neither the federal DOMA nor any state statute modelled after it107 can be regarded 
as having been aimed at a marriage that unquestionably would be valid under the 
M.T. v J.T. reasoning of March 22, 1976; such a marriage would implicitly, and 
logically, be valid in any state that has recognised the reality of transsexualism by 
enacting a birth certificate statute.     
 
Lynn Wardle, another pro-DOMA academic who presented testimony to both 
houses, said of the definitions of "marriage" and "spouse" that 
 
sometimes these terms are used in federal law in a manner that suggests 
that Congress believed that the definition of "marriage" used in state law 
would be satisfactory for the federal law.  Since the differences in state 
marriage laws (though numerous) were relatively minor, and since no state 
allowed such radical reconstruction of marriage as same-sex marriage, the 
passive presumption of adoption of state law has worked quite well.  If 
some state legalized same-sex marriage, that would radically alter a basic 
premise upon which the presumption of adoption of state domestic rela-
tions law was based - namely, the essential fungibility of the concepts of 
"marriage" from one state to another.  Section 3 accurately declares the 
premise upon which two centuries of federal legislation using marriage 
terms has been predicated.108 
 
Wardle also elsewhere prefaces legalisation of same-sex marriage with the word 
"if."109  Clearly, he is referring to something that had not yet occurred in any state.  
This must be repeated: the decision in M.T. v J.T. had happened in New Jersey two 
decades prior!  Wardle obviously was referring to gay, homosexual, same-sex 
marriage, and not a heterosexual marriage in which one spouse is a post-transition 
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 Frye, ‘Facing Discrimination’, above n 94, 465-66. 
106
 1996 House Hearing, 88 (testimony of Hadley Arkes).   
107
 Or, presumably, similar to it but which may already have been in existence. 
108
 1996 House Hearing, 168 (prepared statement of Prof. Lynn Wardle) (emphasis added).  
109
 Ibid 178; 1996 Senate Hearing, 27, fn. 4 (prepared statement of Prof. Lynn Wardle).   
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transsexual and the other spouse is a member of the transsexual spouse's pre-
transition sex.  If he was referring to the latter, then certainly there would have been 
some mention of M.T. v J.T., In re Ladrach (at that point the most recent published 
decision on transsexual marriage110), and, given the historical tenor of his state-
ments, Peipho v Peipho, an 1878 Illinois decision upholding a marriage between a 
man and a "hermaphrodite,"111 and the even older case of Thomasine Hall, an 
intersexed person who an early colonial court in Virginia ruled to be both male and 
female.112    
 
Wardle also utilised an example of a same-sex couple from Utah going to Hawaii to 
get married, getting a judgment related to their marriage, and bringing it back to 
Utah to demand recognition of it which, according to Wardle ‘would flaunt and 
undermine a strong public policy of Utah (which strongly favours and protects 
heterosexual marriage exclusively).’113  Again with this example, the public policy 
implicit in transsexual birth certificate statutes demands that this DOMA (and, by 
extension, all DOMAs) be interpreted in favour of transsexuals: By 1996 the legis-
latures of both Hawaii and Utah had long since enacted statutes officially acknowl-
edging the medical reality of transsexualism and the legal reality of change of 
sex.114  
 
 
4 Revisionism and Non-Revisionism 
DOMA sponsor Rep. Bob Barr, was quoted seven years after the DOMA hearings 
as saying that the issue of DOMA's applicability to transsexuals actually had arisen 
in 1996 via a question from a Representative from North Carolina.  According to 
Barr (in 2003), his response in 1996115 was the smug: ‘The people of Georgia know 
what a man is and what a woman is.  I don't know if you're having problems up in 
North Carolina.’116    Both states, however, by then had enacted statutes officially 
acknowledging the reality of transsexualism: North Carolina in 1975 and Georgia 
only seven years later (meaning, significantly, that Barr's home state of Georgia had 
enacted its statute after M.T. v J.T., so it must be presumed to have known what it 
was doing).117 Barr's comment cannot be interpreted, absent inherent anti-
transsexual bias, to mean that DOMA actually was designed to deem certain hetero-
sexual couples to be homosexual couples.  Rather, it must be interpreted as revi-
sionism on Barr's part in 2003 and/or a total lack of knowledge on his part about 
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 Ladrach, above n 40. 
111
 88 Ill 438 (1878) (the word "hermaphrodite" appears in the syllabus, not the opinion). 
112
 See Katrina C Rose, ‘A History of Gender Variance in Pre-20th Century Anglo-American Law’ (2004) 
14 Texas Journal of Women & the Law (forthcoming). 
113
 1996 House Hearing, 180; 1996 Senate Hearing, 36 (prepared statement of Lynn Wardle).   
114
 1981 UTAH LAWS Ch. 126, § 3; 1973 HAW. ACTS. No. 39. 
115
 Which I have been unable to find evidence of in the pertinent transcripts. 
116
 Paul Schindler, ‘Has the Right Been Muted’, Gay City News, 28 February – 6 March 2003,  
<http://www.gaycitynews.com/gcn209/hastherightbeenmuted.html> (last visited 11 January 2004) 
(quoting Bob Barr).  
117
 1982 GA. ACTS. No. 1216, § 1; 1975 N.C. LAWS Ch. 556.   
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transgender law in 1996.118  In light of this it is not insignificant that at least twice 
in 2004 testimony before congressional committees dealing with gay marriage, Barr 
said nothing about transsexuals.119  
 
Gary Bauer, on the other hand, did take up the subject of transsexual marriage in 
2003, though arguably - and significantly - without any overt revisionism.  In a 
missive entitled The Attack on Marriage, which can be found on the Campaign For 
Working Families website, he questions the ultimate viability of the federal DOMA 
via a portrait of what he styled ‘the 'brave new world' we are currently living in’:120 
a comparison between the outcomes of heterosexual transsexual marriage cases in 
Illinois (in which a judge ruled that an FTM was still a woman)121 and Florida (in 
which a judge, in an 800 page opinion, ruled that an FTM was a man.)122  It is 
actually unclear whether, in 2003, he regarded both of these marriages as actually 
having been encompassed by the 1996 act or that "traditional values" had subse-
quently been ‘discarded for moral relativism.’123  Irrespective of whether he did or 
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 My personal suspicion is that it is the latter - even though he may have felt he was accomplishing the 
former. 
119
 Bob Barr, Testimony to the House Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, 30 March 2004, 
<http://www.house.gov/judiciary/barr033004.pdf> (last visited 2 May 2004); Hearing on the Proposed 
Federal Marriage Amendment, above n 71 (testimony of former Rep. Bob Barr).  In the June hearing 
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sexuals.  Notably, during his colloquy with Barr, Hatch (as he has in other committee hearings and on the 
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[M]any of our friends on the other side, and even some on our side, from time to time love to 
have the courts do for them that which they could never get through the elected representa-
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40 states basically approving it, I doubt that they could get this changed in the law of mar-
riage – away from traditional marriage, to, to same-sex marriage - I doubt they could get that 
in any state in the union through the elected representatives of the people. 
 
If Hatch, Musgrave and the other FMA supporters were to contend that it is indeed intended to wipe out 
transsexual marriages, then, given the 25 state-level jurisdictions that have unquestionably approved of 
transsexualism via their legislatures, courts interpreting the FMA will have to contend with statements 
such as this – which, in an ‘FMA targets transsexuals’ construct, will be as egregiously inaccurate as can 
be imagined.  Also during this portion of the hearing, Sen. Jeff Sessions of Alabama remarked, ‘No 
legislature, no state, Mr. Barr, since the founding of this Republic, has ever voted to define marriage 
other than between a man and a woman.’  Though Sessions was never an Alabama state legislator, he 
was once its Attorney General – meaning that, in theory, he had authority to issue opinions interpreting 
Alabama’s transsexual birth certificate statute.  ‘Senator Jefferson B. 'Jeff' Sessions (AL)’, PROJECT 
VOTE SMART, <http://www.vote-smart.org/bio.php?can_id=BC034032> (last visited 26 September 
2004); 1992 ALA. ACTS No. 92-607, § 19. 
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 ‘Illinois Court Rules Against Transgender Father’, Illinois Gender Advocates Newsletter, May 2003, 
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 Kantaras v Kantaras, No. 98-5735CA (Fla Cir Ct, Pasco Co, 21 February 2003). 
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 Bauer, above n 120.  Notably, the Family Research Council, an organisation that Bauer headed at the 
time of the DOMA hearings, published a guide to model so-called pro-family legislation in 2003.  Of 
course, ‘pro-family’ has been morphed by religionists into being synonymous with ‘anti-gay’ and, 
usually, ‘anti-GLBT.’  However, of the 16 pieces of legislation utilised in the book, the only two perti-
nent ones were the Ohio Super DOMA bill and Utah's anti-gay-adoption bill.  Nothing is mentioned in 
the section accompanying the Ohio bill regarding the unclear status of transsexuals in that state.  More 
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did not, again missing from the equation is the pre-DOMA M.T. v J.T.  And, 
equally important is word "new," which I emphasised, because, however he may 
now portray his mindset as being regarding a federally-mandated definition of 
marriage, he unquestionably had the opportunity to elucidate on heterosexual trans-
sexual marriage in testimony to Congress in 1996 (something no transsexual was 
allowed to do, and something that no gay, lesbian or heterosexual person who 
testified did do.) 
 
Now, despite Barr's apparently-revisionistic 2003 anecdote and Bauer's apparent 
post-1996 discovery of the fact that heterosexual transsexual marriage is not same-
sex marriage,124 the one 1996 DOMA-related mention of gender variance in the 
context of legal identity and marriage appears actually to have come in the prepared 
statement of Ernest Chambers, a member of the Nebraska Legislature: 
 
If, as many argue, every human being is "created" heterosexual; that "God 
makes no mistakes" and that the locus of sexual orientation is in the geni-
tals, what is the "genetic" sexual orientation of the hermaphroditic person 
who is "created" with both female and male sexual organs?  Would not 
such a person be "homosexual" regardless of which gender was preferred?  
And would it not be "genetic"?125 
 
In light of Chambers being a legislator there, it must be noted that Nebraska by then 
had had a transsexual birth certificate statute (albeit for only two years.)  Not until 
2000 did it enact its 'SuperDOMA.'  It must also be noted that searches in the All-
news database on Westlaw regarding Initiative 416 (the popular name for Ne-
braska’s ‘SuperDOMA’) revealed 205 items on the measure,126 but only one that 
also mentioned transsexuals - and that item was dated several months after the 
measure passed.127  Speculation in recent commentary is that the ‘practical implica-
tions’ of Initiative 416 ‘are not fully understood.’128  However, if heterosexual 
                                                                                                                                 
importantly, though, the book did not include, as one of its 'models', the 1977 Tennessee anti-transsexual 
birth certificate statute.  Family Research Council, State Model Legislation Guide 2003 (2003) 39-41, 
61-68. 
124
 Still, transsexual marriage was not addressed in a debate in 2004 between Bauer and now-former 
HRC head Elizabeth Birch.  Eric Resnick, ‘Gary Bauer, Elizabeth Birch Spar in Debate on Marriage’,  
Gay People’s Chronicle, 1 October 2004,  
<http://www.gaypeopleschronicle.com/ stories04/04oct1.htm#story4> (last visited 4 October 2004).  
This news item isn’t a transcript, of course.  However, the reporter informed me via e-mail that neither 
Birch nor Bauer mentioned transsexuals.  ‘E-mail from Eric Resnick to Katrina Rose’ (4 October 2004, 
5:59 PM CDT) (copy on file with author). 
125
 1996 House Hearing, 70 (prepared statement of Sen. Ernest Chambers).     
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 "Initiative 416" & DA(AFT 01/01/1998), Westlaw search, ALLNEWS database, run 24 October 
2003.  The beginning date was chosen simply to encompass any early discussion on the initiative that 
might appear.  The earliest item retrieved by the search is dated 14 September 2000. 
127
 The 'item' was the letters-to-the-editor section of the June 26, 2001 edition of the Omaha World-
Herald, but "Initiative 416" and "transsexuals" appeared in separate letters.  ‘Public Pulse’, Omaha 
World-Herald, 26 June 2001, 14, 2001 WL 9579516.  Taking this into account, there were no items 
about both the initiative and transsexuals. 
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 Angela Dunne Tiritilli and Susan Ann Koenig, ‘Advocacy For Nebraska Children With Gay and 
Lesbian Parents: A Call For the Best Interests of the Child to be Paramount in the Case of Non-
Biological, Non-Adoptive Parents’ (2002/2003) 36 Creighton Law Review 3, 7. 
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marriage involving transsexuals had any connection with same-sex marriage, at 
least outside of the imagination of anti-GLBT judges, then there would certainly be 
some further connection between the two in the public discourse over that citizen 
initiative,129 particularly given the existence in the state not just of the birth certifi-
cate statute but also the situs of one of the most well-known hate-crime murders of 
a transgendered person.130 
 
5 Massachusetts 
Massachusetts, home of a transsexual birth certificate statute since 1981131 and situs 
of several transsexual hate-crime murders,132 is home to ground zero in the gay 
marriage debate in 2004.  And, transsexuals’ concerns are absent from that debate.  
While it would be impossible to detail all discussions which evidence trans-
absence, one event of interest is a recent debate on same-sex marriage at Boston 
University.133  Mary Bonauto, counsel for the plaintiff couples in Goodridge, in her 
opening remarks stated that there were no objections when the U.S. Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                                 
Interestingly, a documentary on the enactment of the measure not only does not include any mention of 
any possible effect on transsexuals’ rights by Initiative 416, when the documentary refers to general 
Nebraska GLBT history it refers to Brandon Teena as ‘Teena Brandon’ and with female pronouns.  416 
(Apartment 101 Films, 2004). 
129
 Admittedly, not all of the items also contained gay-specific terms as well. "Initiative 416" & (GAY 
LESBIAN HOMOSEXUAL & "SAME SEX") & DA(AFT 01/01/1998), Westlaw search, ALLNEWS 
database, run 24 October 2003.  This lowered the number of items retrieved to 120, but the absence of 
any reference to transsexuals remains.  
There is also no indication whatsoever that a Nebraska statute which actually is obviously anti-
transsexual, namely the alignment in 1993 of that state's disability anti-discrimination law with the 
transgender-exclusion language of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act, 1993 NEB. L.B. 360, § 3, 
could in any way have pre-emptively abrogated the explicit recognition of transsexualism by that same 
legislative body the following year when it enacted a transsexual birth certificate statute.  1994 NEB. 
L.B. 886, § 4, codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-604.01 (2003).  It is fully within the bounds of legal 
logic for a state to recognise transsexualism as a legitimate medical condition and to recognise the 
logical end of a treatment regimen (namely, a full change of sexual status), but, at the same time, decide 
that such condition is not necessarily cause for a transsexual person to be able to challenge employment 
discrimination based on transsexualism as a disability (as opposed to sex.)  Nebraska would not be 
unique.  Prior to 2000, California, despite its 1977 transsexual birth certificate statute, utilised the anti-
transsexual language of the federal disability construct.  See 2000 CAL LAWS Ch. 1049; and Bernice 
Yeung, ‘Better Than Nothing’, SF Weekly, 18 April 2001, <http://www. sfweekly.com/issues/2001-04-
18/bayview.html/1/index.html>.  Consequently, the Nebraska ADA should not be read in conjunction 
with Initiative 416 to manufacture non-recognition public policy.  After all, it was after it had adopted 
the anti-transsexual federal language that the Nebraska Legislature enacted its transsexual birth certifi-
cate statute! 
130
 See The Brandon Teena Story (Gréta Olafsdóttir and Susan Muska, dir. 1998); see also, State v Lotter, 
669 NW 2d 438 (Neb, 2003); State v Lotter, 664 NW 2d 892 (Neb, 2003); Brandon v County of Richard-
son, 653 NW 2d 829 (Neb, 2003); Brandon v County of Richardson, 624 NW 2d 604 (Neb, 2001); State 
v Lotter, 586 NW 2d 591 (Neb, 1998); Brandon v County of Richardson, 566 NW 2d 766 (Neb, 1997); 
State v Nissen, 560 NW 2d 157 (Neb, 1997). 
131
 1981 MASS. ACTS. Ch. 684. 
132
 Nancy Nangeroni, ‘The Murder of Chanelle Pickett’, <http://www.rememberingourdead.org/ peo-
ple/chanellepickett.html> (last visited 2 May 2004). 
133
 CSPAN Television (USA), American Perspectives, ‘Should Government Accept Same-Sex Marriage’ 
(10 April 2004) (debate taped 7 April 2004). 
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overturned restrictions on interracial marriage in 1967,134 restrictions based on 
poverty-related matters in 1978,135 and restrictions based on felon status in 1987.136  
Apart from the fact that in no way was the landscape as placid as she depicted it in 
the immediate aftermath of Loving,137 quite telling is an example that she did not 
give: the transsexual marriage validated in 1976 in New Jersey in M.T. v J.T.  
Admittedly, she was citing examples of decisions of finality by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, but the final word on the meaning of Massachusetts Constitution, insofar as a 
reading of it recognising same-sex marriage, is no more of an issue for the U.S. 
Supreme Court than would have been the decision of New Jersey’s courts uphold-
ing the view that the concept of 'sex' in that state encompassed recognition of the 
reality of transsexuals and transsexualism. 
 
Also speaking in favour of gay marriage at Boston University was Jonathan 
Rauch,138 positing that he can in reality marry no one if he cannot marry a male, and 
asserting that historically only two groups ever have been so prohibited: slaves and 
children.139  Although the logical conclusion to various rationales (chromosomes, 
procreation, etc.) behind closing the doors of marriage to transsexuals has appar-
ently never materialised in an American court (namely, that a transsexual can marry 
no one), it did gel in an Australian court with respect to the marital rights of an 
intersexed person, and only a quarter-century ago.140  Genevieve Wood, of Gary 
Bauer's former group, the Family Research Council, went to the 'bisexual orienta-
tion' slippery slope argument - asserting that there would be no reason for a bisexual 
person to demand the right to be married to one person of the same sex and one of  
the opposite sex.  Notably, in all of her arguments regarding marriage and the 
family structure, she said nothing about transsexual marriage,141 a fact notable in 
and of itself as to Massachusetts.  However, the current head of the FRC, Tony 
Perkins, was a Louisiana state representative in 1999 when its DOMA statute – that 
said nothing about transsexuals even though the state had had, for over three dec-
ades at that point, a transsexual birth certificate statute – was enacted.  In fact, he 
was even a co-sponsor of it.142 
 
                                                        
134
 Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1 (1967). 
135
 Zablocki v Redhail, 434 US 374 (1978). 
136
 Turner v Safley, 482 US 78 (1987). 
137
 Certainly while there was no rush of hysteria approaching that enveloping the possibility of legalised 
same-sex marriage, it cannot be said that there was no opposition - particularly to Loving.  State constitu-
tional provisions of the variety rendered unenforceable by Loving remained in existence into the 1990's, 
and even then the referendum to remove the provision passed by only a not-so-overwhelming margin. 
‘Controversial Amendments’, The Herald (Rock Hill, S.C.), 5 November 1998, 11A, 1998 WL 7646279. 
138
 Jonathan Rauch, Gay Marriage: Why it is Good for Gays, Good for Straights, and Good for America 
(2004). 
139
 American Perspectives, above n 133.  
140
 Specifically, In re the Marriage of C & D (falsely called C).  As noted above, above n 23, with the 
more recent decisions in Australia recognising transsexualism, it is doubtful that C & D is still good law.  
However, the fact that such a decision occurred as recently as it did cannot be ignored. 
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 American Perspectives, above n 133. 
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 1999 LA. H.B. 1450 (engrossed). 
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Hadley Arkes, who had testified at the 1996 DOMA Hearings in favour of DOMA, 
failed to mention transsexuals at the Massachusetts event.143  Likewise, so did the 
two student debaters on the panels.  And, the matter was not mentioned by the 
audience members (both pro- and anti-same-sex marriage) who posed ques-
tions/comments to the panel. Of course, this is no different than the recent DOMA 
oversight / FMA-precursor hearings and the rhetoric leading to them. Akin to her 
statement this year, a press release issued by Rep. Musgrave in response to the 
November 2003 decision from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court implies 
that nothing "non-traditional" had ever previously been recognised.  ‘Gay marriage 
activists that have been shopping around for judges willing to overturn this tradition 
finally found their sympathetic bench.  Overnight these judges pulled up the rug and 
found a new right for gay marriage.’144 
 
Moreover, in a five-page (yet detailed) document issued following the clarification 
decision in February, the U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee railed against 
the "judicial activism" in Massachusetts and detailed past pushes for gay marriage 
(namely, Alaska and Hawaii) and even did mention New Jersey.  However, the 
mention was not of M.T. v J.T.  Rather, it was the ongoing gay marriage case of 
Lewis v Harris.145  Transsexual marriage is not mentioned even with respect to 
states where it has been the subject of litigation.146  Similarly, in a lengthier docu-
ment issued in 2003 in the aftermath of Lawrence v Texas, New Jersey is mentioned 
- but, again, not for M.T. v J.T.; rather, it was for the Boy Scouts v Dale litigation.147 
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 Although, he did manage to bring up NAMBLA (the ‘North American Man-Boy Love Association’,  
a group, to whatever degree it actually exists at any given time, which is synonymous with paedophilia) 
and to liken opposition to same-sex marriage to opposition to the Patriot Act because of the unknown 
possibilities of each. American Perspectives, above n 133. 
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 ‘Marriage is in Clear and Present Danger’ (Press Release, 18 November 2003), <http://johnshadegg. 
house.gov/srs/word/Musgrave112403.pdf> (last visited 2 May 2004). 
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 No. MER-L-S-03, 2003 WL 23191114 (NJ Super Law Div, 5 November 2003). 
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 Republican Policy Committee, ‘Judicial Activism Forces Same-Sex Marriage on the Nation’, 
<http://rpc.senate.gov/_files/Feb1104Marraige2SD.pdf> (last visited 2 May 2004). 
147
 Republican Policy Committee, ‘The Threat to Marriage From the Courts’,  
<http://rpc.senate.gov/_files /CIVILsd090403.pdf> (last visited 2 May 2004). 
Notably, in another such document from 2003 - this dealing with the proposed federal hate crimes law 
which contains language that some feel is inclusive of all transgendered people - this 'Policy Committee' 
clearly indicates that it knows the difference between homosexual and transsexual.  Republican Policy 
Committee, ‘The Kennedy "Hate Crimes" Bill: An Unwise Proposal’, 2 <http://rpc.senate.gov/ 
_files/CRIMEcr071503.pdf> (last visited 15 June 2004) (‘every crime where the victim is a homosexual, 
a transsexual, a transvestite, disabled, or a known member of a religion’).  In a footnote referring to a 
congressional committee report which included language expounding on the breadth of the word "gen-
der" in the bill, the 'Policy Committee' summarised by stating that the congressional report gave "exam-
ples of crimes against persons dressed up as members of the opposite sex and against transsexuals, and 
indicat[ed] that the Kennedy bill would apply to those crimes."  Ibid. fn. 2; and 4, fn. 13.  There is 
obvious cognisance, and tacit recognition, of a difference between transvestites and transsexuals.  The 
closest that this 'Policy Committee' report comes to actually challenging the legal legitimacy of gender 
transition (despite hyperbole about such "behaviour" offending certain people's "deeply-felt moral 
convictions") is the impotent single placement of quotations around the phrase ‘sex change’ when 
referring to sex reassignment surgery - something that even many in the pro-recognition camp do based 
on the belief that the phrase is outmoded, with SRS, GRS or CGRS being more medically appropriate.  
Ibid 11. 
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And yet, with all of this as the backdrop, ‘The heavy hand of DOMA has fallen 
with particular severity on transsexuals, regardless of their sexual orientation.’148 
 
C The DOMA Mindset in General 
 
1 The Effect on Transsexuals 
 
(a) Littleton and Gardiner 
 
On October 27, 1999, an intermediate appellate court in San Antonio, Texas, issued 
an opinion upholding a trial court's invalidation of a heterosexual marriage between 
a male-to-female transsexual and a non-transsexual male.149  Although inherently 
disheartening to the surviving party to the marriage (the wife) and to transsexuals 
throughout Texas and America, the bare ruling was not inherently shocking, though 
a contrary positive ruling actually would not have been particularly shocking either.  
That decision was Littleton v Prange.  Prior to it, case law existed on both sides of 
the gender-transition recognition aisle, though, by far, the heavy weight of authority 
by 1999 tilted in favour of recognition.150 
 
What was shocking to many, and what will always make Littleton stand out as a 
landmark decision, albeit a negative one, is that it was apparently the first instance 
of any court in the United States citing the federal DOMA to invalidate a marriage 
that had been assumed by all involved - not simply the parties themselves but those 
with whom they interacted and even at least one arm of state government151 - to be a 
legal heterosexual, opposite-sex marriage.152  As the words of a song that was 
popular earlier that year had intoned, ‘The real troubles in your life are apt to be 
things that never crossed your worried mind, the kind that blindside you at 4 p.m. 
on an idle Tuesday.’153  So it was with Littleton v Prange when the Texas transsex-
ual community learned of the case that fall,154 and saw themselves dropped into a 
                                                        
148
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149
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battle that not only had not been of their making but was one that they had had no 
input in whatsoever: the modern push for same-sex marriage.   
 
After Littleton came In re Gardiner, in which, after an extremely enlightened opin-
ion from an intermediate appellate court,155 the Kansas Supreme Court invoked not 
one but two Kansas state DOMAs in obliterating the womanhood (in Kansas at 
least) of Park University Professor J’Noel Gardiner, a Wisconsin-born male-to-
female transsexual.156   
 
By far the more significant of the two is the one enacted in 1980, the end result of 
three successive legislative sessions (from 1975 to 1980) of attempts to pass anti-
marriage legislation.  The complete entry in the minutes of the 21 January 1976 
Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, quoted in part in the Gardiner Court of Ap-
peals opinion,157 reads: 
 
Senator Pomeroy appeared on S.B. 350 which would amend K.S.A. 23-
101 to provide that marriage shall be entered into by two parties of the op-
posite sex.  The bill would also amend K.S.A. 23-106 so that a probate 
judge could not issue a marriage license to two parties of the same sex.  
This bill would affirm the traditional view of marriage. 
 
Senator Storey moved to recommend this bill favourably for passage.  Senator 
Talkington seconded this motion which was approved by a voice vote of the Com-
mittee.158 
 
The first paragraph corresponds to the supplemental information entry on S.B. 
350.159  The provision of S.B. 350 which is critical to this discussion was slightly 
different, though not substantively, than that which ultimately became law in 1980.  
S.B. 350 would have altered Section 23-101 to read ‘The marriage contract is to be 
                                                                                                                                 
article my stance has become a bit less harsh (in part because of further analysis of the opinion and 
coming to the conclusion that the general anti-transition-recognition language in it is even farther off-
base than I'd asserted in 1999), it is still my view that, because of the facts of Mrs. Littleton's case and 
because of the pathetic job of presenting the case that occurred up through the intermediate appellate 
level (my frequent co-authors, Alyson Meiselman and Phyllis Frye, took over representation of Mrs. 
Littleton after the decision which yielded the oft-cited published opinion), a legitimate opinion could 
have been issued by the San Antonio Court of Appeals upholding the summary judgment against her but 
nevertheless respecting transsexuals' rights in general or making plain that the court was taking no 
position on transsexuals' rights in general. 
155
 22 P 3d 1086 (Kan App, 2001). 
156
 42 P 3d 120 (Kan, 2002). 
157
 Gardiner, 22 P3d, 1093. 
158
 Minutes of the Kansas Senate Committee on Judiciary, 2 (21 January 1976). 
159
 Brief of Bill: 
SB 350 would amend K.S.A. 23-101 to provide that marriage shall be entered into by two 
parties of the opposite sex.  The bill would also amend K.S.A. 23-106 so that a probate judge 
could not issue a marriage license to two parties of the same sex. 
    Background: 
 This bill would affirm the traditional view of marriage. 
1975 KAN. S.B. 350, Supplemental Information (italics in original).  
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considered in law as a civil contract, entered into between two parties of the oppo-
site sex….’160  The same language appeared in the substantively similar bill from 
the 1977 Session, S.B. 309.161  Committee amendments occurred, though not affect-
ing the ‘opposite sex’ clause. 
 
Still, the 1977 bill did not pass. 1980 Senate Bill 609, as proposed by, among oth-
ers, Senator Donald Allegrucci, was titled as: 
 
An act establishing the family and children trust fund; providing for the 
deposit of certain fees in such fund; increasing the marriage license regis-
tration fee; amending K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 23-108, 23-109 and 23-110 and 
repealing the existing sections.162 
 
This bill contained no mention of same-sex marriage, although the manner in which 
it did touch upon marriage – the increase of the license fee – did garner significant 
attention.163  By far, however, the main issue when the bill was before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee on 21 February and 25 February was the trust fund aspect of 
the bill.  In fact, in the entries on the minutes from both hearings refers to S.B. 609 
with the heading ‘Family and Children Trust Fund Established.’164 
 
The 21 February hearing was devoted entirely to S.B. 609 and, although a letter was 
submitted from the Kansas Catholic Conference expressing concern over the bill’s 
‘possible extension into the field of family planning,’165 the only apparent testimony 
involving marriage per se appears to have come from Dr. Kenneth Mauldin, who, 
according to the minutes appearing on his own behalf as a pastor, testified that he 
has a philosophical problem with the bill.  He stated that he is not opposed to the 
programs the bill is designed to fund; he simply questions whether this is the right 
way to raise these funds.  He stated that whenever a fee is charged that is more than 
the actual cost of administering the marriage license program, the state is in effect 
taxing marriage.  He stated he has concerns about keeping church and state sepa-
rate, and when a tax is placed on marriage, he fears that line might be crossed.166 
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 1975 KAN. S.B. 350, § 1.  
161
 1977 KAN. S.B. 309, § 1. 
162
 1980 KAN. S.B. 609, Preamble. 
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 In light of the purported ‘defense of marriage’ slant given to anti-same-sex marriage bills and statutes 
in the 1990’s, the remark of S.B. 609 supporter Sen. Frank Smith, described by the Topeka Capitol-
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Marriage License Fee Hike’, Topeka Capitol-Journal, 5 March 1980, 11. 
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 Minutes of the Kansas Senate Committee on Judiciary, 1 (21 February 1980); Minutes of the Kansas 
Senate Committee on Judiciary, 3 (25 February 1980). 
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F. Pomeroy (20 February 1980). 
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 Minutes of the Kansas Senate Committee on Judiciary, 2-3 (21 February 1980). 
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Eighteen people spoke in favour of the bill, either personally or on behalf of organi-
sations.167  The Kansas Women’s Political Caucus was represented by Kathleen 
Sebelius, who asserted that the raising of the marriage license fee to $17.00 would 
not make it ‘prohibitive.’168  After further discussion and amendments, on February 
25th the Committee favourably reported the bill to the full Senate169 - which is 
where the damage would occur. 
 
On 4 March, while S.B. 609 was under consideration by the Committee of the 
Whole, Senator Pomeroy, the author of the 1975 and 1977 stand-alone bills, moved 
to add a section to the bill which would amend Section 23-101 to read: ‘The mar-
riage contract is to be considered in law as a civil contract between two parties who 
are of opposite sex….’170  According to the Kansas City Times this ‘was adopted 
without discussion.’171  The House Judiciary Committee minutes of 25 March and 
26 March dealing with the amended bill make no mention of Pomeroy’s ‘opposite 
sex’ clause.172  Considering the lack of discussion of the amendment on the Senate 
floor, it is by no means clear whether the bill’s proponents were even aware of the 
change, much less overtly supportive of it.173  
 
In 1980, Senator Donald Allegrucci was a co-author of the Pomeroy-amended bill.  
He was a member of the Judiciary Committee that considered Pomeroy’s stand-
alone bill and the 1977 bill.   
 
The author of the 2002 anti-recognition Gardiner opinion? Justice Donald Alle-
grucci. 
 
His having resorted to a 1970 dictionary definition in 2002174 in order define what 
the Legislature meant in 1980 is deeply disturbing. There simply was no need to so 
resort.  Allegrucci had a hand in all three attempts at adding that anti-marriage 
provision to Kansas law.  There can be no conclusion other than that he knew 
exactly what had been intended by the clause, for every bit of legislative history 
points only to an intent to prohibit homosexuals from attaining legal status for same-
sex unions.  Beyond being devoid of logic (by virtue of being out of date even in 
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 Minutes of the Kansas Senate Committee on Judiciary, 1-3 (21 February 1980). 
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 Minutes of the Kansas Senate Committee on Judiciary, 2 (21 February 1980) (entry regarding testi-
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 Minutes of the Kansas Senate Committee on Judiciary, 3 (25 February 1980). 
170
 1980 Kansas Journal of the Senate, 1011 (emphasis added). 
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1980), utilising a 1970 dictionary in 2002 to clarify what the legislature could have 
done then is an egregiously unethical second bite175 at the legislative apple. 
 
Of course, it stands as a shining example of what can happen once anti-same-sex 
marriage laws become enshrined in the statute books: judges, claiming with straight 
faces to be strict constructionists, will legislate anti-transsexual clauses clearly, per 
the historical record, never envisioned by the legislature onto these laws. 
Laws enacted against gays’ quest for same-sex marriage. 
 
Transsexuals pay the price. 
 
(b) 2003: In re Nash and Barr 
 
Ohio's courts have a history of producing ridiculously transphobic opinions in cases 
involving issues of transsexual identity.176  Even more ridiculous is the weight 
afforded the various opinions.  A 1976 intermediate appellate court opinion dis-
missively turned aside a request by a non-Ohio-born transsexual to secure recogni-
tion of gender transition.177  Despite the fact that it could arguably be used to 
support transition non-recognition in the state, that unpublished decision, Maxey v 
Appel, has been all but ignored. 
 
A quarter-century after that decision, the Ohio Supreme Court issued an exceed-
ingly short opinion recognising the right of a pre-operative transsexual to secure a 
name change.178  The brevity of that decision was the result of it simply being an 
adoption of another opinion, issued a few weeks earlier, where the issue had been 
the ability of same-sex couples to establish a last name in common - and it obscures 
the depth of transphobia in the lower court opinions, which had all held against 
MTF transsexual Susan Maloney on overtly religious grounds and nebulous con-
cepts of public policy179 
 
In between some early cross-dressing cases (which mostly had TG-positive out-
comes) and recent name-change cases (also positive) was In re Ladrach, a 1987 
probate court opinion which had approved of a name change for a MTF but ruled 
that Ohio did not recognise the ability of transsexuals to conform their birth certifi-
cates to post-transition reality.180  Despite the fact that this opinion is from the 
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lowest level of court in the state - a level of court that, in most other states, would 
not even be allowed to issue published opinions - Ladrach is regularly afforded 
more legitimacy than conflicting (and far better-reasoned) appellate authority.181 
 
Such was the situation when Jacob Nash and Erin Barr sought a marriage license. 
 
In August 2002 (around the same time that the Ohio Supreme Court had decided In 
re Maloney, the transsexual name change case), Nash, a FTM transsexual, and Barr, 
a non-transsexual female, sought a marriage license in Trumbull County, Ohio.  
Although Nash was born in Massachusetts and effectuated an updating of his birth 
certificate pursuant to that state's transsexual birth certificate statute in April 2002, 
he had applied for and received a name change in Tumbull County, Ohio in 2000.182  
The paperwork connected with the name change had included the pre-transition 
version of his birth certificate - and that 2000 paperwork was reviewed at the time 
of the 2002 marriage application.  Additionally, the marriage application did not 
include mention of Nash's pre-transition marriage to a man - although a subsequent 
amended application did.183 A subsequent separate application (which also did 
include disclosure of the pre-transition marriage), resulted in a hearing in which 
Nash was questioned by the probate court regarding his SRS.  On advice of his 
counsel, Nash refused to answer, asserting that the conformed post-transition Mas-
sachusetts birth certificate offered all necessary answers to questions regarding his 
sex.184 
 
Both applications were denied - and the couple appealed both denials, asserting the 
following issues: 
 
The trial court erred in holding appellant's application for a marriage li-
cense to a higher evidentiary standard than the standard to which it holds 
other applications, thereby denying appellants equal protection of the laws 
under the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of 
Ohio 
 
and 
 
The trial court erred in refusing to give full faith and credit to Jacob Nash's 
valid, corrected Massachusetts birth certificate when he presented it in 
support of appellants' application for a marriage license.185 
 
A 2-1 majority of the Court of Appeals, with the lead opinion authored by Dianne 
Grendell, took only eight paragraphs to dispose of the first point, devoting most of 
the opinion to the second. 
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Noteworthy, though, is that in declaring that the Ohio marriage statute utilised to 
deny the license (based on the non-disclosure of the marriage and on the question of 
Nash's sex not being resolved to the trial court's satisfaction) is, as applied to the 
couple, a ‘reasonable regulation that does not significantly interfere with decisions 
to enter into the marital relationship and, thus, for purposes of equal protection 
analysis, the statute is entitled to examination under the rational basis standard,’ 
following that sentiment with ‘States possess a legitimate interest in protecting the 
institute of marriage within its borders,’ Grendell cited to the federal DOMA.186   
 
Even more interesting was the manner in which she concluded that Ohio did not 
need to give any legal effect to Nash's post-transition birth certificate, relying on 
general evidentiary rules to construct an illusion of immateriality - not only regard-
ing the conformed sex designation on Nash's birth certificate but also, and far more 
disturbingly, the entire existence of transsexual birth certificate statutes.  While 
acknowledging the existence of the U.S. Constitution's mandate that ‘Full Faith and 
Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Pro-
ceedings of every other State,’187 Grendell went on to note federal statutes which 
purport to limit that language by declaring that such acts, records and proceedings 
are to be given the effect that they have in the state from which they originate.  This 
would seem not to be a problem regarding Nash's birth certificate - except that 
Grendell goes on to cite Massachusetts evidence law as viewing birth certificates to 
be ‘prima facie evidence of the facts recorded’ therein, meaning that evidence can 
be presented to rebut the presumption established by the document.  Then it would 
be up to the court to make a decision based on all evidence.  According to Grendell: 
In this case, the amended birth certificate submitted by Nash as evidence of his sex 
was rebutted by the evidence already in possession of the trial court, to wit, Nash's 
original birth certificate designating Nash's sex as female. Thus, the trial court gave 
Nash's amended Massachusetts birth certificate the proper full faith and credit, 
prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein.188 
 
While this may seem like a logical application of evidentiary principles, it is actu-
ally a ruse - one which totally ignores an aspect of law which anti-GLBT courts are 
all too eager to cite against GLBT people: public policy. 
 
Unlike one of the previous anti-transsexual Ohio opinions, the 1987 Ladrach pro-
bate court opinion - in which the authoring judge clearly expresses the view that a 
state which enacts a transsexual birth certificate statute is stating that someone who 
undergoes SRS and conforms his or her birth certificate to the post-transition sex 
designation may marry as a member of that post-transition sex189 - Grendell showed 
an absolute lack of capability of believing that there could be a public policy any-
where in favour of transition recognition: a policy evidenced by the very fact that 
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the legislature of a given state has recognised the medical and social reality of 
transsexualism via enactment of a statute allowing transsexuals to conform their 
birth certificates to the reality of their post-transition existence.  Her creation of a 
‘prima facie evidence’ loophole is one which would allow any judge or administra-
tive official to manufacture an exception in every case involving any transsexual, 
thereby swallowing any and all logical conclusions mandated by the existence of 
legislative recognition of transsexualism. 
 
Nevertheless, Grendell's reliance on ‘public policy,’ might possibly have had merit 
if Ohio had statutes which were diametrically opposed to - and, therefore, presuma-
bly incompatible with - recognition of gender transition.  However, Ohio had (and 
still has) no statute with transsexual-specific wording purporting to legislate against 
transsexualism190 - and, despite the notorious Maloney and Ladrach lower court 
opinions, the overall state of authoritative Ohio decisional law is mixed, being 
arguably at worst only slightly unfavourable to recognition of transsexual identity 
though, arguably, more in favour of it.191  As have other courts, she referred to 
‘public policy’ emanating from Ohio's non-transsexual-specific birth certificate 
statute as allowing only ‘Errors/Mistakes’ on birth certificates to be dealt with post-
issuance.   
 
Aside from the fact that this ignores the science of transsexualism, which has pro-
gressed to the point where conforming of a sex designation to post-transition reality 
must be objectively recognised as indeed correcting an error, it also ignores the fact 
that the anti-transsexual spin put on Ohio's birth certificate statutes was created by 
judges - and, as such, can be dispensed with by judges as having been supplanted or 
having been wrong from the start.  For, while it is true that the Ohio Legislature has 
never enacted positive transsexual-specific language (with the only such bill of 
which I am aware, almost a decade pre-Ladrach in 1979, having passed in the 
House only to die in the Senate)192, it had also never seen fit to enact negative 
transsexual-specific language to ensure that no other court might come to a different 
conclusion than Ladrach. 
 
Unfortunately, Nash & Barr was not appealed.  Consequently, the day when legiti-
mate gender transition analysis might emerge from an Ohio appellate court is still 
not in sight. 
 
2. From DOMA to the FMA 
The legislative history of DOMA was complete in 1996, but that of the FMA (and 
new state DOMAs) is ongoing.  Such trans-absence as has been demonstrated above 
would, in any other context, be decidedly negative for transsexuals.  However, this 
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absence in this context should be, at least in retrospect, regarded as a positive - a 
mandate for such legislation not to be construed against transsexuals, whatever the 
initial inclination might be of those in a position to construe them against transsexu-
als. 
 
But, if all of that is not enough, once the FMA has become part of the U.S. Consti-
tution, another nugget of history might seem useful to have to combat it – perhaps 
something akin to Louisiana State Sen. John Hainkel’s connection to his state’s 
transsexual birth certificate statute 36 years prior to his involvement with his state’s 
DOMA.  Of course, as noted in Part II, there was no Federal Gender Transition 
Recognition Act and, even if there was, no one from the Congress of 1948 is around 
to form a Hainkel-esque nexus. 
 
Or is there? 
 
No, there indeed is not an FGTRA, but a number of FMA proponents began their 
political lives in state legislatures.  One (of many) is the aforementioned Colorado 
Rep. Marilyn Musgrave.193  Another is one of her state’s U.S. Senators, Wayne 
Allard – who also is one of the sponsors of the FMA.  Twenty years ago, as a Colo-
rado state senator, Allard was a co-author of the bill which, when it took effect, 
established Colorado’s transsexual birth certificate statute.194   
 
Although that 1984 statute is not of the clear, stand-alone variety195 that the 1968 
Louisiana statute typifies, and although I have been unable to find 1984 Colorado 
citations to the type of trans-positive colloquy that occurred in Louisiana in 1968, 
the principle of the ‘Hainkel Connection’ should apply: even if Allard now asserts 
that anti-same-sex marriage language that does not specifically deal with transsex-
ual marriages wipes such marriages out nevertheless via a so-called ‘ordinary, 
common meaning,’196 it cannot be contended that Allard himself had no knowledge 
of more complicated concepts – concepts which must be imported to such a sweep-
ing proposal as a national ban on same-sex marriage. 
 
Still, the question remains: Will all of the above save transsexuals when the FMA 
becomes part of the constitution? 
 
But, what also must be asked is: Why was such a positive body of queer legal 
development forcibly tied down to a railroad track with both the DOMA and FMA 
locomotives speeding toward it?  Part VI may offer some insight into this.  How-
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ever, before that, it will pay to fully explore all of what has been tied down to the 
railroad track – and it may not be simply transsexuals’ identity and marital rights. 
 
 
V EMPLOYMENT LAW 
 
When it comes to employment discrimination protection, most Americans think of 
Title VII.  Transsexuals are no different (though we also think of ENDA, but for 
political reasons.)  However, as Stephanie Belser observed in 1998, perhaps the 
phrase ‘don’t make a federal case of it’ should be heeded occasionally.197 
 
A Title VII and Oiler v Winn-Dixie 
When he was not at work with the non-fictional grocery store chain Winn-Dixie, 
Peter Oiler, a married, heterosexual male, would go out cross dressed in public 
approximately one to three times per month.  Judge Lance Africk described Oiler 
thus: 
 
He shaves his face, arms, hands, and legs. He wears women's underwear 
and bras and he uses silicone prostheses to enlarge his breasts. When he is 
cross dressed as a woman, he adopts a female persona and he uses the 
name "Donna".198 
 
He had been cross-dressing in public since 1996. 
 
On October 29, 1999, [Oiler] told Gregg Miles, a Winn-Dixie supervisor, that he 
was transgendered. He explained that he was not a transsexual and that he did not 
intend to become a woman. However, he   told Miles that for a number of years he 
had been appearing in public at restaurants and clubs while cross dressed.  He told 
Miles that while he was cross dressed, he assumed the female role of "Donna". He 
asked whether he would be terminated if Michael Istre, the president of Winn Dixie 
Louisiana, Inc., ever saw plaintiff cross dressed as a woman.199 
 
Miles had a private meeting with Istre that same day in which Miles told Istre that 
Oiler was transgendered and had been appearing in public cross dressed as a 
woman. Istre subsequently contacted Winn-Dixie's counsel for legal advice.200  Istre 
and Miles made the decision to terminate Oiler’s employment with Winn-Dixie, 
several times asking Oiler to resign.  On January 5, 2000, when Oiler did not resign 
voluntarily, Winn-Dixie fired him.201  According to Africk: 
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The reason [Oiler] was terminated was because he publicly adopted a fe-
male persona and publicly cross dressed as a woman. Specifically, Istre 
and Miles, acting for Winn-Dixie, terminated Oiler because of his lifestyle, 
i.e., [Oiler] publicly cross dressed for several years by going to restaurants 
and clubs where he presented himself as "Donna", a woman. Istre and 
Miles believed that if [Oiler] were recognised by Winn-Dixie customers as 
a cross dresser, the customers, particularly those in Jefferson Parish where 
[Oiler] worked, would disapprove of the [Oiler’s] lifestyle. Istre and Miles 
thought that if Winn-Dixie's customers learned of [Oiler’s] lifestyle, i.e., 
that he regularly cross dressed and impersonated a woman in public, they 
would shop elsewhere and Winn-Dixie would lose business. [Oiler] did not 
cross-dress at work and he was not terminated because he violated any 
Winn-Dixie on-duty dress code. He was never told by any Winn-Dixie 
manager that he was being terminated for appearing or acting effeminate at 
work, i.e., for having effeminate mannerisms or a high voice. Nor did any 
Winn-Dixie manager ever tell [Oiler] that he did not fit a male stereotype 
or assign him work that stereotypically would be performed by a female.202 
 
Precisely how big the grain of salt that the last two sentences should be taken with, 
is for the reader to decide. 
 
Oiler sued pursuant to Title VII and, in an unusual turn for a transgendered Title 
VII plaintiff, was the moving party on a summary judgment motion.  Of course, 
Winn-Dixie has its own motion. 
 
When Africk began his discussion of Title VII case law, unsurprisingly, Africk led 
with Ulan and added mention of seemingly all of the anti-transsexual Title VII 
decisions.203  Of course, of those, he didn’t bother to mention that one had been 
transsexual-positive, though on a Rehabilitation Act claim.204  Nevertheless, Africk 
went on to produce his own version of why a transgendered person should lose a 
Title VII claim. 
 
Despite the fact that the number of persons publicly acknowledging sexual orienta-
tion or gender or sexual identity issues has increased exponentially since the pas-
sage of Title VII, the meaning of the word "sex" in Title VII has never been 
clarified legislatively. From 1981 through 2001, thirty-one proposed bills have been 
introduced in the United States Senate and the House of Representatives which 
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have attempted to amend Title VII and prohibit employment discrimination on the 
basis of affectional or sexual orientation. None have passed. 
 
In contrast to the numerous failed attempts by Congress to include affec-
tional or sexual orientation within Title VII's ambit, neither plaintiff nor 
defendant can point to any attempts by Congress to amend Title VII in or-
der to clarify that discrimination on the basis of gender or sexual identity 
disorders is prohibited. Neither party has identified any specific legislative 
history evidencing Congressional intent to ban discrimination based upon 
sexual or gender identity disorders.205 
 
Included therein was the denigration of the attempt to use Price Waterhouse to get 
out from under the two paragraphs quoted immediately above. 
 
The Court in Price Waterhouse implied that a suit alleging harassment or 
disparate treatment based upon nonconformity with sexual stereotypes is 
cognizable under Title VII as discrimination because of sex. This theory 
would not bootstrap protection for sexual orientation into Title VII be-
cause not all homosexual men are stereotypically feminine, and not all 
heterosexual men are stereotypically masculine. But, under this theory, re-
lief would be available for discrimination based upon sexual stereo-
types.206 
 
Interestingly, then, in a footnote, Africk stated, ‘Long after Price Waterhouse was 
decided, courts have continued to hold that discrimination on the basis of sexual 
preference or orientation is not actionable under Title VII because it is not discrimi-
nation based on a person's ‘sex.’’207  However, he did not see fit to mention the 
Price Waterhouse-esque cases that had gone against the Ulane mindset – cases 
such as Schwenk v Hartford and Rosa v Park West Bank.  Perhaps he could have 
woven a rationale to support his view in spite of these decisions.208  But, their 
absence renders Oiler suspect at best. 
 
[Oiler’s] actions are not akin to the behaviour of plaintiff in Price Water-
house. The plaintiff in that case may not have behaved as the partners 
thought a woman should have, but she never pretended to be a man or 
adopted a masculine persona. 
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This is not just a matter of an employee of one sex exhibiting characteris-
tics associated with the opposite sex. This is a matter of a person of one 
sex assuming the role of a person of the opposite sex. After a review of the 
legislative history of Title VII and the authorities interpreting the statute, 
the Court agrees with Ulane and its progeny that Title VII prohibits em-
ployment discrimination on the basis of sex, i.e., biological sex. While Ti-
tle VII's prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex includes sexual 
stereotypes, the phrase "sex" has not been interpreted to include sexual 
identity or gender identity disorders.209 
 
The Oiler decision was never appealed (not that the ultra-conservative Fifth Circuit 
would have been any more likely to acknowledge the existence of the case law that 
Africk ignored.)  Still, the end result?  So much for a Price Waterhouse path to 
transgender anti-discrimination protection – at least in Louisiana.   
 
B Louisiana Law 
Most states now have their own laws prohibiting employment discrimination based 
on sex and other aspects of personal existence, with many, though by no means all, 
filling gaps left by Title VII and other federal statutes.210  Some state laws predate 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and others were enacted afterward. At the time of the 
enactment of the Civil Rights Act, Louisiana labour law contained an entire series 
of statutes under the heading “Female Persons.”211  For example, one mandated that 
No female shall be employed in any mine, packing house, bowling alley, bootblack 
establishment, in the distribution of merchandise, in or about any place of amuse-
ment where intoxicating liquors are made or sold ... for more than nine hours in any 
one day or fifty-four hours in any one week.212 
 
Ostensibly for the protection of women, the statutes had little, or nothing, to do with 
equality (with one commanding no employment of “women and girls” under condi-
tions ‘detrimental to their health or morals’213), and many remained on the books 
until 1976.214 
 
Furthermore, not until 1983, during the interregnum between Edwin Edwards’ 
second and third terms as Louisiana’s governor, did the state put into place some-
what of a proper state complement to Title VII.  According to a Tulane Law Review 
                                                        
209
 Ibid. *29-30. 
210
 As even an episode of the animated television series King of the Hill demonstrated a few years ago, 
the heavyweight federal employment anti-discrimination statutes only apply to employers with 15 or 
more employees.  FOX Television (USA), King of the Hill, ‘Junkie Business’ (26 April 1998).  Some, 
though not all, states have a lower threshold. 
211
 LA. REV STAT., tit. 23, Part IV (West 1964), repealed, 1976 LA. ACTS. Ch. 24. 
212
 23 LA. REV STAT. § 311 (West 1964), repealed, 1976 LA. ACTS. Ch. 24. 
213
 23 LA. REV STAT. § 353 (West 1964), repealed, 1976 LA. ACTS. Ch. 24. 
214
 Joel William Friedman, ‘Fair Employment Legislation in Louisiana: A Critique of the 1983 Act and a 
Proposed Substitute Statute’ (1983) 58 Tulane Law Review 444. 
2004 The Proof Is In The History  445     
 
article at the time by Professor Joel Friedman, 43 states, D.C. and Puerto Rico had 
such a complementary set-up by 1983.215  Six others, including Louisiana, had a 
‘patchwork of independent statutes’ which did various things; Louisiana’s address-
ing only age and ‘handicap.’216  The ever-regressive Alabama, not surprisingly, had 
no protection for non-government employment settings and precious little for gov-
ernment employment.217 
 
On the last day of its regular 1983 session, however, the Louisiana Legis-
lature made its own attempt at enacting a broad-based equal employment 
opportunity law and passed a statute prohibiting intentional discrimination 
in employment on account of race, colour, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin.218 
 
There was no sexual orientation – either with the Minnesota (or, more accurately as 
to what was in force then, Minneapolis) definition or with the transphobic definition 
utilised in Maryland219 and New York.220  And, there was no stand-alone gender 
identity category. 
 
Yet, a very strong case could be made that if Peter Oiler was not a cross dresser but, 
instead, a transsexual and if he had brought his case against Winn-Dixie under 
Louisiana state law rather than federal law, then the same reasoning which was 
used to reject his Title VII federal court case would have mandated a more favour-
able result for him under state law. 
 
C Unification? 
This is where the fiction of Part II proves its usefulness as an analogy.  What if 
Congress actually had passed a Federal Gender Transition Recognition Act at some 
point before it passed Title VII?  Well, among other things,221 there could be abso-
lutely no validity to any Holloway-Sommers-Ulane-esque absolutist contention that 
Congress had no intention of encompassing ‘because of change of sex’ in the phrase 
‘because of sex’ that was tossed into Title VII by anti-equality forces who simply 
were trying to kill the bill.222  There would be a history of Congress addressing the 
subject of transsexualism, making it rational, even mandatory, to presume that in 
the future when it addressed “sex,” something beyond a non-transsexual-inclusive, 
corporate-authored dictionary definition of “sex” would be what was meant. 
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Alas, there is no FGTRA. 
 
However, as we’ve seen, by 1983 Louisiana had had a transsexual-specific223 birth 
certificate modification statute on its books – for a decade and a half.  The flipside 
of the anti-transsexual reasoning of the Holloway line of cases dictates that there 
can be no validity to any contention that, after June of 1968, the Louisiana Legisla-
ture had nothing more than the so-called traditional (read: not inclusive of trans-
sexuals224) concept of sex whenever it included the word “sex” in a piece of 
legislation. And, logically, that would have to include employment anti-
discrimination legislation enacted by the Louisiana Legislature in 1983 – with or 
without any evidence of any mention of transsexuals during debate on the measure. 
Of course, even if this is recognised as being viable by Louisiana’s courts, there are 
significant gaps – and there will be others.  Post-Oiler v Winn-Dixie, there would 
appear to be no protection for non-transsexual, non-intersexed transgendered people 
at all in Louisiana – at least outside of New Orleans, which has a transgender-
inclusive civil rights ordinance.225  And, even beyond that gap, even if my theory is 
recognised there still would be no concrete protection for any transgendered person 
with respect to federal employment even if the currently-worded ENDA proposal 
becomes law.226  
 
Is my theory a step in the right direction? 
 
Yes – particularly with respect to recognising the full, penumbral vitality of existing 
pro-transsexual legislation. 
 
Is my theory enough? 
 
Certainly not – and with the anti-gay marriage backlash barrelling toward us, it may 
be an incredibly endangered species. 
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people should rely on state and local law until a gay-only ENDA can be amended’ strategy. 
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VI WHY? 
 
 We are definitely advancing.227  
 
Some states will move toward equality, while some will resist and even re-
gress.228 
 
Transphobia is not the only form of intra-GLBT-community bigotry that has ever 
been observed or asserted to exist.  Early on, there were more than a few complaints 
about misogyny.  For example, Martha Shelley, one of the founders of the Gay 
Liberation Front, was particularly disgusted over the habit of Dick Leitsch, head of 
the New York Mattachine Society at the time of Stonewall, of loudly inquiring, 
‘Who opened the tuna fish?’ when women would enter the room.229  And, sadly, 
racism is still not absent.230  Yet, despite rote acceptance of ‘T’ into the acronym, 
transphobia is by far the most pervasive – both by commission and by omission. 
 
Both of the italicised quotes above appeared in the Advocate and are about the gay-
led push for gay marriage – the first quote being from 1997, the second from 2004.  
Both were uttered by the same person: Even Wolfson, one of the most visible 
pushers of the gay marriage agenda.  The second is a bit closer to reality – yet 
doesn’t, in and of itself, reflect exactly whose rights are regressing. Though the 
quest for gay marriage may be in regression, such regression also involves a mov-
ing backward for transgendered people – more particularly, for transsexuals’ iden-
tity and marital rights. 
 
As for who and/or what is moving forward? 
 
In 1999, the National Gay-Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF) determined that it could 
no longer support ENDA if it is not transgender-inclusive – unquestionably a move 
forward in the quest for transgender rights.  To this position, Jeff Epperly, editor of 
Boston’s Bay Windows responded: 
 
In some ways, NGLTF’s stance is admirable. Certainly there ought to be 
laws that protect people based on gender expression. Since so many of us 
are attacked because of unimportant personal characteristics, we empathize 
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with those who are discriminated against similarly. We should support 
transgender efforts to build their own, distinct political movement.231 
 
A clearer gay demand for separate but (presumably, though by no means certainly) 
equal can hardly be envisioned.  
 
Fast forward five years. 
 
In August 2004, the Human Rights Campaign (HRC) adopted a resolution pledging 
to no longer support legislation such as ENDA if the proposals are not transgender-
inclusive.  While I have severe problems with the wording of the resolution – word-
ing that, in my view, gives HRC ample room to continue to work against the best 
interests of transgendered people while publicly professing to be our champion.232 
HRC’s August resolution certainly was a step in the right direction, one that, quite 
frankly I thought the organisation would never take (even if as a substanceless 
phantom gesture.)  If for no other reason, the significance of this resolution can be 
evidenced by the conservative gay media attacks on HRC – attacks which were 
swift and vicious. 
 
Abandoning common sense, the Human Rights Campaign announced in 
early August that it will no longer support federal legal protection for mil-
lions of gay workers unless the tiny number of transgendered workers get 
that protection, too. The decision is a slap in the face to gay Americans, 
who generously fund HRC, and who will now have to wait even longer for 
federal employment discrimination protection. 
… 
HRC also defends its reversal on what it calls “pragmatic” grounds. The 
group’s new executive director, Cheryl Jacques, argues that adding gender 
identity to ENDA is a matter of gay self-interest. She hypothesizes that an 
employer might fire a gay man solely because he’s feminine in appearance 
and manner, rather than because he’s gay. The employer could then pro-
duce gender-conforming gay employees to prove it tolerates such gays, es-
caping ENDA’s sanctions.  
 
That’s a make-weight argument based on a very unlikely scenario. Where 
is this Dodo bird of an employer who loves gays but detests gender non-
conformists? Jacques provides no real-world example, and I am aware of 
none.233 
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Well, for starters, the author of the above, gay Republican law professor Dale 
Carpenter, could start with conservative gay employers.  Take the 1993 remarks of 
an unidentified lesbian who was a hiring partner in a San Francisco law firm: 
 
[S]he is “relatively” out among “people who get to know me,” she says.  
But she usually won’t hire prospective associates who identify themselves 
as gay through participation in gay and lesbian groups or volunteer work. 
  
“When I go [to] law schools and I look at people’s resumes, if they’ve got 
heavy gay or lesbian activities on them, I’m not interested, she says.  Its 
signalling something that makes you different.” 
 
Yes, this quote is now over a decade old.234 But, the sentiment still exists in some 
circles – and, as a hiring principle, when put into play, would not only yield out-of-
hand rejection of those who are ‘gay on the resume’ (or TS on the CV) but, by 
extension, anyone who is visibly non-straight in any way (such as a not-perfectly-
passable transsexual or even a perfectly passable one who has been unable to secure 
identity documentation that would not out her upon completing typical beginning-
of-employment paperwork), who has GLBT-related work experience or simply who 
is ethical and tells a potential law firm employer about an issue that an ethical 
attorney should discuss with potential clients, such as being transsexual. 
 
Chris Crain, the executive editor of the Washington Blade, the flagship paper of gay 
media conglomerate Window Media declared in response to the HRC move that 
ENDA had been “trans-jacked,” and that HRC’s ‘mind-boggling decision is wrong 
politically, legally and morally.’235 
 
That last word is quite curious.   
 
Morally?  
 
His editorial contained the following passage: 
 
Transgendered people in opposite-sex relationships can marry under the 
existing laws of many states.  Should they be denied that freedom until 
same-sex couples can do likewise?  Should heterosexual couples be pre-
vented from marrying until same-sex couples can? 
 
                                                                                                                                 
<http://www.txtriangle.com/archive/1246/vp1.htm> (last visited 23 September 2004). 
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It would be wrong and immoral for us to expect others to be treated un-
fairly until we are treated equally.236 
 
He fails to mention that the number of states in which such opposite-sex couples 
can get married has been shrinking – solely because of the backlash against the gay 
marriage issue, which he has all-but-demanded that the entire GLBT movement join 
forces in pushing, to the exclusion of all else.237 
 
Although in GLBT publications I have long pointed out the hypocrisy endemic in 
those who will push for gay marriage while opposing transgender-inclusion, it was 
not until letters in response to Crain’s August 13th editorial began to appear that it 
became clear that others were seeing the same hypocrisy.  Robert R Sassor stated it 
succinctly: ‘Crain oddly takes a stance that HRC should be incrementalist on work-
place discrimination but all-or-nothing on marriage equality.’238 
 
Crain also failed to use (properly at least) the word “transsexual.”239 
 
This is significant. 
 
Although the subject could fill an entire book,240 and though there is no single 
smoking gun, my feeling based on looking at gay discourse from the past three 
decades is that, however much gay organisations and the gay populace may now 
genuinely be embracing the concept that gender variance must be addressed in 
order for civil rights legislation to truly be inclusive and effective, those who con-
trol the gay rights industry still refuse to actually accept the reality of transsexual-
ism. 
 
Crossdressers?  No problem. 
Drag queens?  No problem. 
Transvestites?  No problem. 
Butch?  No problem. 
Femme?  No problem. 
Transsexualism?  Problem.   
 
                                                        
236
 Ibid. 
237
 Compare Chris Crain, ‘It’s All About Marriage - Like it or Not, Our Movement Needs All Efforts 
Focused on Winning Freedom to Marry, and Our Leaders and Their “Friendly” Politicians are Either 
With Us or Against Us’, Houston Voice, 22 August 2003, <http://www.houstonvoice.com/2003/8-
22/view/editorial/marrige.cfm>, with Peter Rosenstein, ‘More Than Just Gay Marriage’, Washington 
Blade, 5 September 2003, <http://www.washblade.com/2003/9-5/view/columns/marrige.cfm>. 
238
 Robert R. Sassor, ‘Attacks on HRC Unfair’, Washington Blade, 3 September 2004, <http://www. 
washblade.com/2004/9-3/view/letters/>. 
239
 Crain, ‘Trans-Jacked’, above n 235 (though he did use it in an ‘example’ earlier in the piece, he failed 
to do so when he addressed marriage – which is the one key area where “transsexual” specifically and 
not the broader “transgender” applies). 
240
 And, I may indeed do so in my work, though in a somewhat different vein than Viviane Namaste’s 
excellent work.  Invisible Lives: The Erasure of Transsexual and Transgendered People (2000). 
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As late as 2000, the Advocate allowed its prestigious ‘Last Word’ column to be 
used by transphobic right-wing lesbian Norah Vincent to issue a call for what can 
be legitimately described as trans-extermination (politically, if not physically).241  
Even as recently as 2004 it took a concerted outcry from transsexual activists to 
convince Lambda Literary Foundation not to nominate J. Michael Bailey’s The 
Man Who Would be Queen, a horrifically-flawed pseudo-science tract (one that is 
almost as homophobic as it is transphobic242), for a Lambda Literary Award.243   
 
Moreover, there has never been any willingness on the part of the gay community at 
large, or by the organisations that set the gay rights agenda, to accept responsibility 
for the damage done to transsexuals by not only 1979’s lesbian-authored Transsex-
ual Empire244 but also general gay discourse beginning in the mid-1970’s, which 
led to the currently-accepted manufactured reality of exclusion-acceptability.245 
From its founding in 1967 to its purchase in 1975 by conservative gay male David 
Goodstein,246 the Advocate, while no one would confuse it with a purely trans-
gender publication such as Lee Brewster’s Drag, was not transphobic and certainly 
not trans-erasive.  However, the Advocate’s Goodstein-era coverage of 1976’s M.T. 
v J.T. is instructive as to how things changed.  The most significant transsexual 
recognition decision of the decade was as off the radar to the Advocate as the 
FGTRA was to the mainstream American press in the 1940’s.  Of course, there was 
an excuse for the latter; the FGTRA is fictional, created as an illustration for the 
theory I explore in this article.  However, M.T. v J.T. was, and is, real.  While not 
conclusive in and of itself, how the Advocate dealt with this opinion offers a stark 
depiction of the place of transsexual marital rights in the 'gay agenda' or even the 
more narrow 'gay marriage agenda' of the mid-1970's - which is something essential 
to grasp prior to making any effort to interpret any anti-gay marriage statute enacted 
in response to that first modern push for same-sex marriage.247   
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The published opinion in M.T. v J.T. was issued on 22 March 1976.248  The first 
issue of the Advocate with a cover date after 22 March, the 24 March issue, likely 
was actually already on the stands by the 22 March, meaning that, somewhat ironi-
cally in light of the point I'm seeking to establish, the issue that was current at the 
time of M.T. v J.T. actually did feature a story about a transsexual, albeit indirectly.  
One of the cover stories was an interview with actor Chris Sarandon, then an Acad-
emy Award nominee for his portrayal of MTF transsexual Liz Eden249 in the movie 
Dog Day Afternoon.250 
 
No mention is made of M.T. v J.T. in the April 7th issue.  It is unclear when this 
issue would have gone to press - and, in all fairness, I do assume that a March 22nd 
court decision occurred too late to appear in the April 7th issue.  This leaves the 
subsequent issue, that of April 21st, as the one in need of analysis. 
 
Although the largest single portion of the cover of that issue is dedicated to an 
interview with actor (and former preacher) Marjoe Gortner, the U.S Supreme 
Court's March 29th decision in Doe v Commonwealth's Attorney,251 which rejected 
an appeal of a ruling upholding Virginia's sodomy statute,252 is noted as being 
covered in the issue.253  The decision was regarded as being important enough to 
give it stand-alone status - apart from the "Newsline" section, which featured small 
news blurbs from across the country - occupying most of page 6.254  The 
"Newsline" section from that issue did feature an item about a decision from a New 
Jersey appellate court, though not the M.T. v J.T. decision from the Appellate Divi-
sion  Rather, it was the New Jersey Supreme Court's March 25th decision in State v 
J.O.,255 upholding a decision declaring the state's lewdness statute to be inapplicable 
to private conduct between consenting adults.256  Both Doe and J.O. certainly were 
worthy of being covered by the Advocate. However, these decisions occurred after 
M.T. v J.T. Yet, the transsexual marriage decision is not mentioned. 
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At this point, one might ask if marriage in general was not part of the Advocate's 
agenda at the time.  Whatever its position on the agenda may have been, it certainly 
was present; even this April 21st issue contains in item about a gay man's an-
nouncement of his intention to run for a county commissioner's seat in El Paso 
County, Colorado.  Prominent in the piece, however, was mention of his having 
been one of ‘12 gay men married in last year's brief string of legal marriages in 
Colorado.’257  M.T. v J.T., an appellate court decision definitively upholding a 
transsexual marriage, however, is not mentioned. 
 
Another legitimate consideration is whether M.T. v J.T. received any publicity 
anywhere at the time it was issued.  Certainly, if it went largely unnoticed even by 
mainstream media in a pre-Internet era, it might well be unfair to chide the Advo-
cate for failing to notice the decision.  However, M.T. v J.T. did not go completely 
unnoticed at the time.  Focusing just on New Jersey, J.O. as well as Doe were 
covered by the Trenton Evening Times, with the latter of the two making the front 
page of all three editions of the paper.258  The coverage that M.T. v J.T. received 
was almost as significant: a front-page story in two of the three editions,259 and 
mentioned on page three of the other.260  This was not isolated coverage; M.T. was 
also a front-page story in the Newark Star-Ledger.261 
 
To be sure, the word transsexual does not apply to all gender-variant people.  And, 
indeed, transgender is a very useful umbrella term – even though I have encoun-
tered a number of transsexuals who hate the word and refuse to have anything to do 
with it (so much so that they refuse to be involved with political efforts to ensure 
their rights because such politics is generally referred to as ‘transgender’ politics.)  
However, transsexuals cannot be ignored – and neither can transsexualism. 
 
Transsexuals exist – and transsexual-specific (and, ore importantly, transsexual-
positive) law exists: 25 recognition statutes, a number of non-statutory pro-
recognition birth certificate decisions, pro-transsexual criminal law decisions and – 
what should be the ultimate for an incrementalism-addicted, marriage-minded 
movement – marriage recognition, the vast majority of which has gone unchal-
lenged for over a quarter-century. 
 
But, to acknowledge M.T. v J.T. is to acknowledge transsexual law. 
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To acknowledge transsexual law is to acknowledge successful transsexual law. 
 
To acknowledge successful transsexual law is to acknowledge successful transsexu-
als – and it is to acknowledge that a flipside exists to the concept of ‘incremental 
progress’, a flipside in which gays and lesbians, and not the transgendered, consti-
tute the increment that has, rightly or wrongly, been left behind.  
 
Above all else, however, to acknowledge the above, is to acknowledge that there is 
at least the slightest of possibilities that transsexuals are equal to gays and lesbians.  
I firmly believe that this last acknowledgement is something that the organised 
American gay rights industry (as opposed to incredibly transsexual-friendly indi-
viduals therein, even the organisations I criticise in this article – and there are 
indeed some) has yet to show that it is capable of expressing.   
 
Considering the somewhat visceral (yet, I feel, necessarily so) tone of this section, I 
feel it wise to end it by noting that, in spite of the definitional differences between 
gays and transsexuals and in spite of the effort I have put into detailing (again, 
necessarily so), the differences between gay marriage and heterosexual transsexual 
marriage, anti-transsexual bigotry by gays is not (and has never been) solely a 
concern for transsexuals and other transgendered people.  The following appeared 
as a letter to the editor in the San Francisco Bay Times in May of 2001: 
 
I have a problem with people thinking I’m transsexual because of my 
height and body size.  I’m not a transsexual but I get to see firsthand how 
trans people are treated.  I had two lesbians come up to me and spit in my 
face, because they assumed I was like Brandon Teena.  They didn’t know 
me, didn’t talk to me, had never seen me, but yet they made an assumption 
and spit in my face, calling me “a wannabe male” and all this stuff.  And 
these weren’t kids, they were old enough to be my mother!!  I’m 22 years 
old. 
 
And, he was a gay man.262  California hate crimes law at that time did encompass 
anti-transgender violence such as the act detailed above.263  Yet, had it not – and, 
just as with employment anti-discrimination law, there are many jurisdictions which 
include sexual orientation but not gender identity – the act by the lesbians, while 
still some degree of assault, would not have been subject to a hate crime enhance-
ment; but, had the man responded in kind, and, in doing so, uttered one or more 
anti-lesbian epithets, conceivably he could be charged with an assault and be sub-
ject to a hate crime enhancement. 
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Separate and unequal.264 
 
Transgender recognition? 
Transsexual recognition? 
Transgender inclusion? 
Transsexual inclusion? 
 
As the letter above illustrates, the life you save may be your own.  
 
 
 
VII CONCLUSION 
 
In the spring of 1972, John Lennon and Yoko Ono were in the United States - to 
deal with custody concerns over Ono's child from a previous marriage.  However, 
they took advantage of their time in the US to appear on a number of talk shows.  
On May 12, ABC broadcast an episode of the Dick Cavett Show on which they had 
appeared - and on which they performed their then-current song Woman is the 
Nigger of the World.265  Even now, a song with such a title is controversial - and it 
was certainly so then.  ABC didn't want to broadcast the segment in which Lennon 
and Ono perform the song but a compromise was struck in which Cavett inserted an 
advisory prior to the segment. 
 
Prior to the actual performance of the song, Lennon explained where the idea for 
the song, and its title, came from - and why it should not be regarded as racially 
offensive.  As part of this he read a statement from Rep. Ron Dellums, then Chair-
man of the Congressional Black Caucus: 
 
If you define niggers as someone whose lifestyle is defined by others, 
whose opportunities are defined by others, whose role in society is defined 
by others, then good news! You don't have to be black to be a nigger in 
this society.  Most of the people in America are niggers.266 
 
Inspired by that, I have long been tempted to entitle a law review article Transsex-
ual is the Nigger of the Gay World.  Looking extensively at Louisiana newspapers 
from 1968, and seeing the commotion over the mere presence of one African-
American in a state’s entire legislature reminds a person of just how powerful the 
issue of race was – and still is.  Consequently, I’ve decided against such an inflam-
matory title in favour of one that I hope will point to potential positives that can 
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(and should) result from outside-the-box thinking as to the scope of existing pro-
transsexual legislation. 
 
Yet, I nevertheless find Dellums’ words compelling in that even in 2004, transgen-
dered people - and transsexuals in particular - find themselves being defined by 
others - both the public at large and certain people from within the gay rights 
movement. 
 
Defined as to who we are.  Defined as to how we must act when it comes to asking 
for relief from the religionist-inspired bigotry that limits the lives of not just GLBT 
Americans but the vast majority of all Americans. 
 
Transgendered people are told to wait for legal protections while gays, lesbians and 
bisexuals are granted the protections which the transgendered are denied.  Trans-
gendered people are told that gays and lesbians will help add them to the laws 
which were initially written either to ignore, exclude, or pre-empt the rights of 
transgendered people. Yet, time and again, after seeing gay-only employment laws 
enacted it is seen that the next item on the agenda never becomes adding transgen-
dered people to the existing employment law but instead the establishment of same-
sex marriage267 or, as was the case in the early 1990's, gays in the military.   
 
Moreover, not only do transgendered people see the intense backlash against the 
push for same-sex marriage all but remove any chance of there being enough pro-
gressive legislators in a given state to add gender identity to the existing employ-
ment law,268 but this backlash has also generated anti-same-sex marriage laws – and 
transgendered people see these so-called Defense of Marriage Acts used to nullify 
not just transsexuals’ marriages but our very existence in the eyes of the law.  
Currently in Kansas, that state's DOMAs, after having been used to civilly nullify 
J’Noel Gardiner’s legal existence in 2002, are being used to criminalise a transsex-
ual for utilising her conformed, post-transition documentation that the state of 
Kansas itself had issued!269 
 
Yes, transgendered people are told to wait – but gays and lesbians have refused to 
wait for their day on issues which unquestionably face more opposition than em-
ployment anti-discrimination protection for transgendered people.270  And some-
thing more controversial than same-sex marriage can scarcely be imagined.  It may 
well have had more of an impact on the 2004 American presidential election than 
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the fraudulent reasons put forward as justification for war with Iraq.271  And, it may 
well be the wedge issue that allows religionist conservatives to complete its quest to 
divide the African-American vote the same way that a different generation of con-
servatives used African-Americans themselves to divide the previously Democrat 
South.272  
 
Of the advice given by whites to blacks to abstain from violence in their quest for 
equality in the 1960’s, Jean Genet said: 
 
When white men use violence, violence is good.  When blacks use it, they 
are considered animals.  However, it so happens that the blacks have ex-
posed the tricks of language, as they have exposed religious tricks, legal 
shams and social deformities.  Blacks aren’t afraid of words anymore, re-
gardless of the coloration that whites might give them. 
It is evident that recommending non-violence to blacks is an effort to re-
tain the Christian vocabulary which has kept them imprisoned in passivity 
for so long.  However Christian the whites are, they don’t feel guilty about 
using guns.  That is violence.  Asking blacks in America to be non-violent 
means that whites are demanding a Christian virtue which they themselves 
do not possess.  That means that whites are once again trying to dupe the 
blacks.273 
 
Similarly, gays and lesbians, by poking the sleeping dogs of American anti-gay-
marriage sentiment (and anti-gays-in-the-military sentiment before that) before 
utilising their political machinations to aid transgendered people in securing basic 
protections, have demanded the virtue of patience from the transgendered that they 
themselves have shown that they do not possess.  Doing so while telling transgen-
dered people to wait while those in power are ‘educated’ on transgender issues by 
the same people – or at least their successors in political interest – who have kept 
them uneducated is the same class of trick, sham and deformity of which Genet 
wrote. 
 
The fight for re-inclusion of transgendered people into the movement we helped 
establish at Stonewall has been disingenuously described by non-inclusionists as 
everything from riding gays’ coattails274 to “self-sabotage”275 to “foolishness”276 to 
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‘not what Gay pride is about’277 to causing gay men to ‘shudder to think where we 
will end up if the nation turns its attention to ‘transgender chic.’278  Even worse, 
omission of gender identity and expression from ENDA has been likened to ‘pass-
ing a copyright law that covers books, television shows, digital music, and videos, 
but omits a single CD manufactured in a leap year on a Thursday during a full 
moon.’279 
 
It is none of the above. 
 
It is a demand for the same things that gays and lesbians have no problem demand-
ing for themselves.  And, if necessary executing this demand will include detailing 
how transgendered people's quest for equality has been publicly ignored and pri-
vately subverted for decades by the non-inclusionists - in city council meetings, in 
state legislatures and in Congress; indeed, anytime and any place that ‘gay rights’ 
legislation is considered. 
 
By so detailing, we are right. 
 
And, by so detailing, we are doing what little we can to save our lives – and our 
identities, not just from religionist hatemongers but also from an element of the 
traditionally-disaffected world of sexual minorities that should know better than to 
marginalise the weak into oblivion.  The interpretational trend of DOMA legislation 
has created a very real sense of urgency to publicise the truth of how little input 
transgendered people – transsexuals in particular - have had in the gay rights 
movement, and that is a critical element in any analysis of any law which opportun-
istic conservative activist judges might want to apply to gays, lesbians, bisexuals 
and transsexuals.  Sadly, it is only a matter of time before some such religionist 
opportunist on some court in some state decides that a state’s adoption of an anti-
same-sex marriage statute or amendment wipes out the state’s transsexual birth 
certificate statute, wiping out transsexual identities, marriages and (if my employ-
ment law theory proves viable) an avenue to civil rights remedies in states that gays 
and lesbians can only dream about achieving employment anti-discrimination 
protection in.  
 
I strongly assert that the examination of transgender – and transsexual – legal his-
tory heretofore missing from gay rights discourse, will open eyes that need to be 
opened and fill gaps that make the entire GLBT legal framework far more solid. 
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Just as this article does not purport to be a full exploration of that history, it does 
not purport not to be a visceral statement regarding how transsexuals have been 
treated both by our enemies and by many who claim to be our friends.  I do, how-
ever, hope that it serves to prevent future disasters in transgender law and to open 
the eyes of transgendered people (as well as gays and lesbians) to the type of pro-
transgender law that actually does already exist and that could be put to good use 
for transgendered people if we are given a platform within the well-funded gay 
rights movement to sound the clarion call. 
 
In short, I hope that it will benefit all transsexuals, all transgendered people and, 
yes, all gays, lesbians and bisexuals.  Believe it or not, my aim is to unite, not 
divide.  I realise that, after the past four years, such a phrase coming from someone 
associated with Texas (I no longer live there but I was born there and am still li-
censed to practice law there) may seem unbelievable. I assure all, however, that my 
desire is genuine. 
 
Some people who claim to be from Texas actually are from Texas – and some of us 
can actually tell the truth. 
